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Abstract 
Political division in the United States is the subject of much analysis in the fields 
of political science and psychology. While political partisanship looms large over 
discussions of the national political climate’s influence on schools and classrooms, very 
little work exists that directly examines the effects of high school students’ political 
beliefs. Prior research on adults indicates that political partisans are different from their 
non-partisan counterparts in terms of political knowledge and efficacy. Further, studies 
often detect biases in adults’ processing of political information. Although social studies 
scholars are beginning to address issues of political division, researchers have yet to 
directly examine how partisanship influences students’ perceptions, behaviors, opinions, 
and learning. The study described in this dissertation attempts to address this gap.  
The present research is built around an online discussion of a controversial issue. 
Using data from three surveys, a discussion forum, and student interviews, I examine 
differences between partisans and non-partisans prior to the discussion, differences in 
behaviors these two groups exhibit during a discussion, differences in outcomes 
following a discussion, and differences in partisan and non-partisans’ ability to consider 
arguments. The findings of this study generally support the argument that, similar to 
adults, adolescent partisans are substantially different from non-partisans in terms of their 
political perceptions, behavior, and cognition. There are, however, important contextual 
factors, such as having an open classroom climate and composition of the discussion 
groups, which can alter the impacts of students’ partisan identities. 
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 My senior year of high school began during the fall of 2000 at the height of the 
presidential campaign and the beginning of what would become a ballot recount-inspired 
media circus. Being a senior, I was able to take an independent study during the final 
hour of the school day. My sponsoring teacher would usually have CNN on in the 
background while I and a couple other students worked on our various individual 
projects. Through the lens of CNN, I was able to watch the whole recount drama unfold, 
with conservative and liberal talking heads narrating each step of the process.  
 At this point in my life, I identified as a Republican. I attribute this identification 
to my parents. On election night in 1992, I remember being assigned by my fourth-grade 
teacher to color in the states won by each candidate. While dutifully shading the states 
won by George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton, I asked my parents which person we wanted 
to win. Both my parents were what would be described as “moderate Republicans,” 
though by today’s standards, they would likely be considered Democrats. I learned that 
night that my family wanted the Republicans to win and I stuck with that allegiance into 
my early college years.   
Looking back, I doubt my high school self would have been able to give any 
cogent policy reasons for my Republicanism. If asked, I would have likely spouted off 
something generic about them being the party of hard work and self-sufficiency. 
Watching the stories of the contested election unfold on TV, I recall rooting for George 
W. Bush despite having no knowledge of either candidate’s plans or promises. I was 
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bothered that he hadn’t won the popular vote, but found myself quite willing to embrace 
rationalizations about the value of the Electoral College. As the Supreme Court ruled in 
favor the George W. Bush and the Republicans in Bush v. Gore, I accepted the decision 
without much thought as to the constitutional implications or the evidence presented by 
each side.  
 In general, my friends and I avoided talking about politics save for a small group 
of two or three others whom I knew also identified as Republican. These conversations 
were infrequent and arose spontaneously when this particular group of people happened 
to be together. I do not recall any specific policy issues we discussed in this small 
enclave, but I do remember that most of the conversations concluded with an affirmation 
of how stupid and deluded the other side was.  
 While I was hardly the most politically involved person at my school, I believe 
that my senior year captures, to some extent, the experience of political partisanship in 
high school students. Although most are still developing some of the more nuanced 
elements of their own political identity, some have, for one reason or another, identified 
with a major political party. Like most aspects of identity, partisanship has the potential 
to shape how the individual perceives and interacts with the world, even if its impacts on 
cognition and affect are not immediately noticeable. If partisan identity in high school 
students functions similar to that in adults, politics could be shaping the way students 
learn and interact with others (Clark & Avery, 2016).  
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Problem: The Untold Story of Classroom Partisans 
 Understanding the development of partisanship and its impacts on schools is 
increasingly important for social studies educators in a divided political landscape. 
Disagreement is a prominent feature of the American political system, but only rarely do 
disagreements become so intractable as to divide Americans into opposing camps. Yet in 
recent years, partisanship has done almost exactly that. A 2014 Pew Research Center 
survey found that, in addition to substantial numbers of each party holding unfavorable 
opinions of the opposite party, 27% of Democrats and 36% of Republicans viewed their 
political opponents as a “threat to the nation’s well-being” (p. 7). A later Pew survey 
(2016) found that substantial numbers of Republicans and Democrats feel “afraid” (49% 
and 55%, respectively), “angry”(46% and 47%), and “frustrated” (57% and 58%) by the 
other party (p.1). In the same report, just under half of people who converse with people 
with whom they politically disagree find such conversations to be “stressful and 
frustrating” as opposed to “interesting and informative” (p. 29). More worrisome, having 
such conversations does not seem to help participants find common ground. In fact, 61% 
of people surveyed reported that they often found they had less in common with people 
they disagree with than previously thought following a conversation (p. 29).   
 The consequences of this divide are clear for political life: vitriolic campaign 
rhetoric, legislative stagnation, and media balkanization, to name a few. Although these 
factors have seemed particularly prominent in the post-9/11 years (Huddy & Feldman, 
2011), scholars of political polarization connect the current state of division to partisan 
realignments dating back to the 1960s (Abramowitz, 2010; Heatherington & Weiler, 
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2009; Levendusky, 2009). Often, political divides reflect social divides over race, class, 
and religion. Given the intersection of politics with a number of other significant social 
identities, it is unsurprising that partisan allegiance would also be, for many, a salient 
social identity.  
These divisions frequently manifest in the social studies classroom. While the 
citizenship goals of social studies education often seek to prepare young people for 
political engagement, the real world conduct of politics fails to align with the deliberative 
values held by many educators (Achen & Bartels, 2016; Campaign for the Civic Mission 
of Schools, 2011). Further, partisanship among students may breed conflict in the 
classroom, and partisan parents, administrators, and community members may also take 
issue with curricular and pedagogical decisions (McAvoy & Hess, 2013). Political 
conflict can disengage students (Commission on Youth Voting and Civic Knowledge, 
2013) and push them away from electoral politics. There is a growing trend of young 
people preferring direct involvement in their communities to involvement in political 
campaigns (Kahne, Crow, & Lee, 2013).  
 According to major reports (Campaign for the Civic Mission of Schools, 2011; 
Committee on Youth Voting and Civic Knowledge, 2013), the appropriate educational 
response to a polarized political climate is good civic education pedagogy and promotion 
of deliberative values (such as openness to alternative viewpoints). Yet, more empirical 
evidence is needed to support these recommendations. Good pedagogy can increase 
political engagement (Hess & McAvoy, 2015) and exposure to deliberation can increase 
students’ perspective taking (Avery, Levy, & Simmons, 2013, 2014). Research on adults 
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(Mutz, 2006) suggests that political engagement and openness to new ideas are inversely 
related, meaning individuals that are highly engaged in politics tend to be less receptive 
to differing opinions. Data that measures how deliberative dispositions (such as 
openness) interact with students’ political engagement could determine whether the 
relationships observed in adults exist in students.  
 Additionally, political identity has not often been examined as a correlate of 
classroom behavior or learning. Research on adults, however, suggests that political, 
particularly partisan, identities can influence how individuals treat one another (Iyengar 
& Westwood, 2015) and perceive their learning environments (Kelly-Woessner & 
Woessner, 2008). High school students are on the cusp of developing more stable 
political identities (Converse, 1969; Sears, 1983, 1990), so the question of whether their 
nascent identities are strong enough to produce similar effects merits investigation.  
Purpose of the Study 
 There is a lack of work in civics education that addresses the complexity of 
fostering citizenship in a politically divided society. In particular, more information about 
how politics impacts the day-to-day functioning of the classroom would be beneficial. In 
this work, I strive for a more comprehensive understanding of partisan high school 
students and how their political beliefs shape both individual behavior and classroom 
context. I examine how students’ political beliefs and political group identification 
impact them throughout the course of an online discussion. Specifically, I am interested 
in four lines of inquiry regarding partisan and non-partisan students:  
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1. Are partisan students different from their non-partisan peers in terms of 
political and civic knowledge, sense of civic efficacy, and perceptions of 
the classroom environment (e.g., climate for discussion, perceptions of 
classmates, and teacher opinion)? 
2. Do partisan students behave differently than their non-partisan peers in the 
context of small group deliberations? Does the composition of deliberative 
groups (e.g., partisan unanimity, presence of non-partisan members, 
presence of disagreeing partisans) moderate these behaviors? 
3. Are partisan and non-partisan students impacted differently by 
deliberation? In other words, are changes in sense of civic efficacy, 
opinions about political groups (e.g., Democrats, Republicans), or issue 
opinions different between partisans and non-partisans? Does deliberative 
group composition moderate these changes?  
4. Does the strength of students’ partisanship influence the degree to which 
they consider differing opinions or opposing arguments?  
Outline of the Dissertation 
 In order to better understand the behaviors and perceptions held by partisan 
students in comparison to their non-partisan peers, the present study focuses on four areas 
relevant to the social studies classroom: students’ baseline political knowledge and 
political efficacy, behavior during a deliberation, changes in opinions and feelings 
following a deliberation, and assessments of the class at the end of the semester.   
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 The second chapter explores the literature in both social studies and political 
science/political psychology. In reviewing the literature I develop a theoretical 
framework that is grounded in the ideals of education for deliberative democracy and 
social identity theory. I focus on how students develop partisan identities, and what the 
implications are for those identities in the classroom. I close the chapter with a review of 
discussion of controversial political issues in the social studies classroom and the existing 
literature on partisanship in the classroom.  
 The third chapter lays out the research methods for this study of partisanship. The 
research instruments will center on an online deliberation of a controversial political 
issue. Utilizing both quantitative and qualitative methods, I gather data about the impact 
of such a deliberation on individual perceptions of others (partisan and non-partisan), 
student learning, and the interaction of student beliefs and social context. Quantitatively, 
I use three surveys to gather data on student opinions and perceptions before the 
deliberation, after, and at the end of the semester, as well as coded transcripts of student 
deliberations to establish tallies of specific deliberative behaviors (asking questions, 
summarizing positions, expressing opinions, etc.). Qualitatively, transcripts of the 
deliberation and student interviews provide insight into how students perceive and learn 
from the deliberative exercises.  
 The fourth and fifth chapters report and discuss the results of this study. I find that 
partisanship is correlated with differences in student knowledge and political efficacy. 
Partisanship also shapes students’ perceptions of their classrooms and their behavior 
during discussions. I also find that student partisanship impacts students’ response to 
   8 
 
discussions, though these responses are often moderated by students’ discussion group 
conditions. Lastly, student partisans seem to learn from discussions, but generally only in 
a way that reinforces their pre-existing beliefs.  
In the concluding chapter I discuss the significance of these findings for social 
studies teachers and researchers. Further, I highlight the contributions this study makes to 
the field of social studies and social science research.  
Significance of the Study 
 Despite plentiful research on how to achieve discussions that are open, rigorous, 
and informative (e.g., Hess, 2009; Parker & Hess, 2001), little research in social studies 
education focuses on student partisanship and how the particular social and psychological 
functioning of partisan identity may impact learning and the classroom community. Such 
a focus is important for theory and research because it can help shed light on a 
particularly vexing theoretical issue in politics and social studies education: the attempt to 
make civic engagement and deliberative openness coexist. Although some researchers 
(e.g., Hess & McAvoy, 2014; Mutz, 2006) argue that high levels of political engagement 
and openness to new ideas are mutually exclusive ends, social studies educators often 
hold up both as civic ideals. Scholars in political science and psychology have 
extensively explored these contrasting ideas and many of the processes that underlay 
partisan thinking and behavior in adults. Social studies scholars, on the other hand, are 
only beginning to address the paradox. There is a large gap in the research about the 
functioning of students in a politically divided society. In order to address this gap, 
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research is needed that specifically examines the impacts of partisan beliefs of students 
and how such beliefs impact classroom behaviors. 
 The results of this study can also inform teacher decisions about addressing 
controversial political issues in classrooms. For example, as the partisan opinion 
composition of student groups is manipulated, classroom teachers can use data about the 
behavior of partisan and non-partisan students under different conditions when 
considering how to assign their students to small groups. Further, this study can explore 
how student political beliefs impact their perceptions of their teacher and peers. Such 
information can aid teachers in deciding when and how to disclose their political 
opinions. Lastly, more empirical data on how partisan identity shapes classroom behavior 
can provide insights into how other identities influence how students process information 
(see, for example, Goldberg, 2013).  
 Teachers are tasked with preparing their students, partisan and non-partisan, for 
citizenship and the civic world beyond the classroom. A deeper understanding of student 
political orientations would benefit classroom teachers by leading to concrete steps they 
can take to better engage students and establish productive classroom communities. As 
political socialization research indicates (e.g., Kahne et al., 2013; Torney-Purta, 
Lehmann, Oswald, & Schulz, 2001), experiences in the classroom help shape students’ 
political behavior. Studying the behavior and experiences of students with varying 
degrees of partisanship will help educators better pursue the goal of engaged, deliberative 
citizenship.  
 




Partisanship in students is rarely factored into research in social studies education. 
In divided political times, however, understanding how a student with a partisan identity 
thinks and acts in the classroom is increasingly valuable. Partisanship can both enhance 
and detract from student learning and civic engagement. In this chapter, I begin by 
outlining a theoretical framework based on the goals of democratic education and social 
identity theory. I then turn to student identity and how partisanship can develop and 
function as a salient social identity, as well as the benefits and drawbacks to such an 
identity. Finally, I examine common classroom practices and how they relate to or are 
affected by student opinions and identities.  
Theoretical Framework 
Democratic Education 
Basic conceptions of citizenship usually entail a combination of rights and 
responsibilities: legal protections, paying taxes, etc. Civic educators, however, generally 
advocate for a more robust understanding of what it means to be a good citizen.  
 There are differing notions of what “good” citizenship entails. In their 
observations of democratic education programs, Westheimer and Kahne (2004) identified 
three different notions of citizenship: personally responsible, participatory, and justice 
oriented. Personally responsible citizenship education focuses mainly on allegiance and 
identification with the country, emphasizing historical knowledge and patriotism. 
Participatory citizenship education encourages students to become actively involved in 
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governing institutions and the democratic process. Examples of participatory citizenship 
include attending city council meetings, writing or signing petitions, or running for 
office. Justice-oriented citizenship education highlights social ills and injustices, focusing 
on how students can work to improve society.  
 Later models (Kahne & Middaugh, 2008) build on the idea of societal 
improvement focusing on fostering student capacity, commitment, and connections. 
Capacity refers to the knowledge and skills needed to actively participate in civic life, 
such as knowledge of institutions and media literacy. Commitment reflects a student’s 
attention to and care about important societal issues. Connections are the important social 
interactions and relationships that allow students to network with similarly committed 
individuals and act collectively towards goals. Likewise, the Campaign for the Civic 
Mission of Schools (2011) envisions ideal citizens as people who “are informed and 
thoughtful, participate in their communities, are involved in the political process, and 
possess moral and civic virtues” (p. 6). In short, ideal citizens fulfill both their civic duty 
and actively strive to improve their communities and the nation through involvement and 
participation.  
Education for Deliberative Democracy 
If students are to have the capacity to improve society, they need to be able to 
engage with their fellow citizens to solve community and national problems. In most 
modern democracies, citizens express their will through voting though many scholars 
argue that this represents a weaker form of democracy than that envisioned for the United 
States. Rather, these scholars (e.g., Gutmann & Thompson, 2004; Habermas, 1996; 
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Mansbridge, 1980) argue that deliberation offers a better approach to decision-making. 
Although there is much overlap with other forms of discussion, deliberations are 
distinctive in that participants specifically pursue solutions to common problems (as 
opposed to greater understanding or an articulation of positions).1 In pursuit of these 
solutions, deliberative participants offer reasons for their views and listen to others with 
different views.  
Education holds an important place in deliberative theory because the skills for 
deliberation about important public issues must be taught and practiced (Jefferson, 
1824/1903; Parker, 2010). In particular, students need to develop the analytical skills 
necessary to understand societal problems and propose solutions. Additionally, 
deliberative participants need to learn to speak and listen in ways that can bridge 
difference and build consensus. Schools are ideal locations for deliberation, as they are 
often students’ first sustained contact with individuals outside their immediate family or 
community, and provide environments where students can explore the nature of the 
common good (Hess 2009; Hess and McAvoy 2015; Parker 2003; Robinson, 2008) 
 As ideal as they sound, theories of deliberative democracy are not without their 
critics. One major critique of deliberation, in fact, is that it is too idealistic. Hibbing and 
Theiss-Morse (2002), for example, note that deliberative processes do not necessarily 
deliver on the promise of sound, legitimate decisions acceptable to all participants. For 
example, jury deliberations can wrongly convict or acquit defendants. Deliberative 
                                                
1 When describing the study in future chapters, I will often use the terms “discussion” and 
“deliberation” interchangeably, reflecting that the discussions in this study are 
deliberative but may not meet the entire theoretical criteria for deliberation.  
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theorists may reply that unsuccessful deliberations can be blamed on flaws in the 
procedures of deliberation, rather than the construct itself. Such replies, however, lead 
scholars such as Mutz (2008) to question whether deliberative theory is falsifiable. If 
deliberative failures are attributable to flaws in specific cases, then there is no instance 
where deliberation as a theory could be disproven. Further, even the strongest proponents 
of deliberation acknowledge there are few, if any, situations that fully adhere to all the 
specifications of an ideal deliberation.  
 In addition to the theoretical objections, deliberation is subject to a number of 
practical critiques. Although proponents of deliberative democracy argue that it is the 
most equitable process of making decisions, the façade of equal voice and access may 
conceal issues that privilege certain voices above others (Sanders, 1997; Young, 2000). 
For example, a key element of deliberation is the exchange of reasons among 
participants. The definition of a valid “reason,” however, is very firmly situated in an 
Enlightenment model that grants precedence to rational or empirical forms of evidence. 
Such a model dismisses individual stories and experiences as anecdotal or, worse, appeals 
to emotion. Yet, as many disenfranchised communities may not have the resources or 
connections to gather compelling empirical data, stories may be the only opportunity they 
have to share their perspective. Further, cultural differences in modes of expression result 
in certain groups being excluded from the largely rational environment of deliberation. In 
short, the rules of deliberative evidence and expression end up reinforcing existing 
societal inequities (Sanders, 1997). Apple (2008) raises a similar issue when discussing 
deliberation in the classroom, noting that certain rules of communication dominate 
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discussion in schools. Even if alternative forms of expression and evidence are permitted 
in a deliberative space, there is no guarantee they will be well received by the other 
participants. The very act of deliberation does not inherently remove the biases of those 
involved (Young, 2000). For example, women participating in deliberations are often 
perceived as having lower status. As a result, they often speak less and are interrupted 
more frequently (Karpowitz & Medelberg, 2014; Karpowitz, Mendelberg, & Shaker, 
2012; Krupnick, 1985; Mendelberg, Karpowitz, & Goedert, 2014; Snyder, 2014).  
 While deliberation in the classroom is a worthwhile endeavor, educators should 
be aware of its limitations. At the same time, educators can create a space for 
traditionally marginalized voices in their classroom deliberations and focus on the ability 
to discuss across multiple types of difference. Use of deliberation is vital for students as 
they learn to engage in a political and societal sphere that is deeply divided along 
numerous lines of politics, class, race, and gender.  
In order for deliberation to be a fruitful endeavor, however, more research into 
students’ participation in deliberations is needed. Teachers who use deliberation would 
benefit from more research into the cognitive and social processes that occur during 
deliberative activities. Given that the focus of the current analysis is student partisanship, 
I draw heavily on works from political science and psychology covering partisan thinking 
and behavior. Chief among these works are those pertaining to partisanship as a social 
identity.  
Social Identity Theory 
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Social identity theory (Tajfel, 1970; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) emphasizes the 
importance of group identification in influencing individual thinking and behavior. When 
group membership is a salient part of an individual’s self-concept, they will seek to 
bolster the status of that in-group, often at the expense of out-groups. Greene (2004) 
argues that social identity theory is a compelling way to view partisan identification. 
Partisanship goes beyond simply voting for the group that best reflects one’s belief on the 
major issues of the day. Rather, partisans will often tow the party line and root for their 
“team,” even when the party’s policies may contrast with their stated beliefs 
(Groenendyk, 2013; Lenz, 2012). According the Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes (2012), 
partisanship as a social identity explains the particular rancor that characterizes recent 
American electoral politics. Affective polarization (or dislike of opposing partisans) 
based on social identities leads Republicans and Democrats to, in addition to disagreeing 
on matters of policy, generally view their opponents as ill-willed or threatening (Pew 
Research Center, 2014).   
 For social identity theory to be compelling in the context of student deliberations, 
it is necessary to illustrate the impacts of student identity in classrooms. The next two 
sections explore how student identities shape classrooms and how political partisanship 
can represent a salient social identity to students.  
The Importance of Student Identity 
 Identity is more than a collection of adjectives and affiliations. Rather, it forms a 
lens through which individuals view the world. Group identities, in particular, tend to be 
quite powerful. Fraser-Burgess (2012) argues that most group identities, be they political, 
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economic, religious, cultural, or otherwise, carry with them beliefs that are viewed by 
members of the group as beyond question. In other words, because certain beliefs are 
definitive of membership in a social group, to question them would threaten an 
individual’s standing in that group. Further, as social identity theory predicts, individuals 
will seek to maintain a positive image of their own groups. In this section, I focus on 
studies that illustrate how students’ identification with various societal groups (race, 
religion, etc.) influences their thinking and behavior in social studies classrooms.  
 In social studies classes, one of the most common manifestations of group identity 
lies in students’ interpretation of historical narratives. Race, for example, often predicts 
whether students will be critical or accepting of traditional representations of United 
States history. Epstein (2009) documents disparities in the narratives White and Black 
students use to summarize major events in United States history. White students, though 
often acknowledging moments when the United States failed to live up to its ideals, 
generally stick to a narrative of continuous progress. Black students, on the other hand, 
are far more critical of the national narratives presented in schools and educational 
materials, emphasizing historical injustices and continuing disparities in opportunity. 
These tendencies are typically reinforced in students’ homes, with White families tending 
to affirm a generally positive view of national history and Black families being more 
critical. White students are often uncomfortable with challenges to the dominant narrative 
that reflect poorly on their race. Trainer (2005), for example, notes that White students 
will often seek to distance themselves from historical or literary illustrations of 
oppression by members of their race.  
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 Strong religious identification can also frame student interpretation of information 
and events. James (2010) notes that undergraduate students with unwavering certainty in 
their theological beliefs tend to be unwilling to entertain alternative non-religious 
explanations on a wide variety of issues.  New events are often interpreted through the 
religious framework in a manner that continually reinforces existing beliefs and 
narratives. Schweber (2006) documents such a phenomenon in her observations of a 
Christian school during and after the September 11, 2001 attacks in New York City and 
Washington DC. Students and teachers at the Christian school placed the terrorist attacks 
into a fatalistic narrative of divine control (i.e., “Everything is part of God’s plan”) and 
used the attacks to highlight fundamentalist Christian views on subjects such as suicide 
and death.  
 Similar identity-based phenomena have been identified in international research. 
Catholic and Protestant students in Northern Ireland emphasize historical evidence that 
supports their particular identity and worldview, becoming increasingly entrenched in 
their religious identities as they study history (Barton & McCulley, 2005). Porat (2004) 
found that Israeli and Palestinian students reinforce their identities when they recall 
historical information. When asked to retell what they knew about conflicts in the region, 
Jewish and Palestinian students tended to recall more details supporting their group’s side 
of the conflicts.  
 It is important to recognize that identities can be complex. It is likely that an 
individual student will identify with multiple groups (e.g., a student might identify as 
both Black and Christian). Some aspects of a complex identity may be more important 
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than others at a given time. A student’s racial identity may be more relevant to some 
discussions than their religious identity, and thus would be more salient in those 
situations.  
Partisanship as an Identity 
 Given that individual identities tend to be multifaceted, it is likely that some 
elements of a student’s self-concept will be more meaningful than others. According to 
social identity theory, in-group/out-group distinctions form around significant social 
identifications. For student partisanship to influence civic outcomes, perceptions, and 
behavior, it would need to be a meaningful part of student identity. This section explores 
political partisanship as a potential foundation for in-group/out-group biases. First, I 
review the literature on the polarized political landscape of the United States and how 
social identities may drive divisive partisan behavior. Then, I examine the question of 
whether partisanship is a meaningful part of young people’s political identities. 
Partisan Polarization 
While partisanship is hardly a new phenomenon in the United States, political 
divides have become more noticeable in recent years. Scholars disagree over the extent 
and manifestation of polarization, or whether the term is warranted at all. These scholars 
can be grouped into three broad camps: political polarization, political sorting, and 
affective polarization.  
 As the term implies, political polarization involves the American population 
clustering at the ends of the political/ideological spectrum. This suggests that fewer 
individuals have moderate or mixed ideologies than in previous decades. Nationwide 
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studies of the American electorate, such as the American National Election Studies 
(ANES) indicate that more Americans are exhibiting greater issue consistency 
(Abramowitz, 2010; Abramowitz & Saunders, 2008). In other words, more and more 
individuals are expressing consistently liberal or conservative positions and fewer are 
expressing a mixture. The trend of increasing consistency is particularly evident among 
voters who display high levels of political interest, political knowledge, and campaign 
participation. Polarization is also represented in an increasing correlation of political 
party preference and ideological position. Since the 1960s, there have been diminishing 
numbers of conservative Democrats and liberal Republicans (Abramowitz & Saunders, 
2008).  
 Other scholars argue that concerns over polarization are overblown and that the 
public is more “sorted” than polarized. Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope (2006) argue fears of 
polarization are largely a response to the polarization of political elites (e.g., politicians, 
party officials, and activists). Few would suggest that these elites are not polarized, but 
Fiorina et al. believe that those polarized sentiments have not filtered into the mass 
public. The mass public is still, in their estimation, relatively moderate. Levendusky 
(2009) argues that the changes in political alignments viewed in the ANES or other data 
represent a sorting process. Because of elite polarization, liberal and conservative 
individuals are increasingly able to identify which political party best reflects their views. 
Although the sorting process creates an illusion of polarization, very few Americans are 
moving to the extreme ends of the political spectrum.  
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Still other scholars define polarization not as the ideological shuffling of 
politicians and the public into opposing camps, but as negative affect that result from 
these shifts. Contentious politics may be part and parcel of a two-party political system, 
but especially so if those parties represent salient social identities. In that sense, concerns 
over whether American politics is becoming polarized or sorted may be secondary to 
whether or not the parties represent opposing social groups. As social identity theory 
suggests, individuals will seek to bolster their feelings about salient in-groups and harbor 
negative feelings toward out-groups. Using multiple datasets, Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 
(2012) found that American partisans increasingly express dislike toward the opposing 
side. While the trends are particularly pronounced among the politically engaged, 
negative affect toward the out-party is also present among average citizens. Substantial 
numbers of partisans, for example, respond that they would be uncomfortable having 
their child marry someone of the opposite political party. Additionally, Americans 
increasingly view members of the out-party as threats to the well-being of the nation 
(Pew Research Center, 2014). Iyengar and Westwood (2015) found that research 
participants discriminate against out-party members in evaluating job candidate 
qualifications. Further, the effect sizes for party-based discrimination outweighed those 
for race and gender.  
 Scholars who study affective polarization often link their work to social identity 
theory. As noted earlier, social identity theory predicts that individuals will seek to 
bolster the status of in-groups at the expense of out-groups. Greene (2004) argues that the 
winner-take-all nature of most American electoral competition naturally sets the two 
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major parties in opposition to each other. Party loyalties can be quite strong, in many 
cases causing individuals to set aside their individual interests (Groenendyk, 2013). 
Research by Lenz (2012) finds that partisan individuals will often shift their opinion to 
match that of their party when they conflict.  
Young People as Partisans 
 Partisanship can constitute an important identity for members of the voting public 
at large. This section explores whether or not young people as a group behave in ways 
similar to the rest of the public 
How Political Identity (and Partisanship) Develops 
Some scholars suggest that there are deep roots to a person’s politics. 
Evolutionary psychologists suggest that there may be at least a partial link between a 
person’s genetics and their political orientation. For example, using data from studies of 
twins, Alford, Funk, and Hibbing (2005) identified a partial genetic basis for political 
ideology (though the link was not as strong when it came to partisan identity). A 
biological basis for political orientation, while not deterministic, could prove influential 
in swaying individuals towards one ideological camp or another. A longitudinal study by 
Block and Block (2006) found a correlation between pre-school students’ personality 
traits and their later political orientations. Students who were more energetic, for 
example, tended to be more liberal whereas students who were more rigid were more 
likely to be conservative two decades later.  
Although dispositions may cause individuals to lean in one direction or another, 
socialization remains an important part of students’ political development. Interaction 
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with parents is a key element of political socialization and, in many cases, eventual 
partisanship. Early models of political socialization viewed political ideas as being 
transferred directly from parent to child. More recent models, however, emphasize that 
children’s political development is a more interactive process. McDevitt (2005), for 
example, proposes a model of developmental provocation where children initiate political 
conversations (usually as a result of exposure to political ideas in school or on the news) 
with their parents and receive feedback. McDevitt’s panel study surrounding the 2000 
election found that the degree to which students initiated political conversations with 
their parents was predictive of students adopting a partisan identity.  
 Adolescence is a particularly influential time in the development of an 
individual’s political identity. It is generally thought that political beliefs tend to 
crystalize during adolescence (Converse, 1969; Sears, 1983) and teenagers are likely to 
begin expressing partisan preferences (Jennings & Markus, 1984). Research indicates that 
environmental influences are significant in the types of political identities students 
develop. Kahne, Crow, and Lee (2013), for example, found that the pedagogical 
emphases of the school environment lead citizens to prefer differing types of political 
engagement. In their study, students who attended schools where controversial issues and 
current events were discussed tended to prefer engagement in electoral politics, such as 
volunteering for campaigns. Students whose schools emphasized community service and 
other forms of direct engagement, however, tended to prefer these forms of civic activity 
over more campaign-oriented activities. McDevitt and Kiousis (2007) also note that 
schools are not alone in influencing adolescent development. Discussions and learning 
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from school spill over into family and peer conversations. In McDevitt and Kiousis’s 
research, family influence generally pushed students towards electoral participation while 
peer influence tended towards community activism.  
Recent Trends in Young People’s Political Participation 
Research on young people’s political development may give the impression that it 
follows a set, maturational pattern. It is important, however, to take cohort differences 
into account when studying the political development of young people. As noted above, 
young people’s political identities and behaviors may be shaped by the political climate 
surrounding their development. Levendusky (2009) argues that young people are 
currently more likely to be politically polarized than previous generations on account of 
growing up in an era of contentious political discourse. Drawing on ANES data, Stoker 
and Jennings (2008) found individuals who came of age between 1996 and 2004 showed 
more issue constraint (alignment between issue positions and partisan identification) than 
previous generations did at the same age.  
 The polarized environment may also serve to disengage young people from 
politics. A 2013 report from the Committee on Youth Voting and Civic Engagement cited 
polarization as one of the largest threats to young people’s political engagement. Some 
scholars, however, argue that political engagement among young people is not so much 
declining as it is shifting. Youth, while not voting or participating in electoral politics in 
large numbers, are more directly involved in their communities and in activism (Dalton, 
2008; Zukin, Keeter, Andolina, Jenkins, & Delli Carpini, 2006). While some community 
service is due to school requirements or resume building, many students participate in 
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such activities out of genuine desire to make a positive difference (Jones & Hill, 2003). 
For students motivated by the latter, frustration with partisan politics may steer them 
towards community activism instead of political campaigns.  
 When young people engage in politics and political campaigns, much of that 
engagement happens in the digital realm. As the present study utilizes online 
deliberations, it is important understand some of the differences between politics in the 
online and face-to-face realms, especially among young people. A 2012 Pew Survey 
(Rainie, Smith, Schlozman, Brady, & Verba, 2012) found that, among social media users, 
younger people are far more likely to use the various platforms for political engagement 
(such as commenting on issues, posting political links, encouraging voting, etc.). There 
are important differences between deliberations that take place in the online and face-to-
face worlds. Using survey data from individuals who had participated in both deliberative 
formats, Wojcieszak, Baek, and Delli Carpini (2009) found that online deliberations were 
perceived to be more diverse, but also more individualistic (meaning that individuals 
deliberating online may learn a lot, but are less focused on solving community problems). 
When discussing controversial issues in classrooms, there seems to be little difference in 
the quality of online or face-to-face deliberations (Guiller, Durndell, & Ross, 2008). In 
fact, online discussions in classrooms tend to have more equal levels of participation than 
face-to-face discussions, which can be dominated by more talkative students (Busbin, 
2013; Larson, 2003).  
Partisan Identities: Benefits and Drawbacks 
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Up to this point, I have discussed the evidence that suggests that some high school 
students may have partisan identities. In this section, I examine both positive and 
negative outcomes associated with partisanship identities and argue that they could 
impact students in the classroom and later in life.  
Benefits of Partisanship 
In many ways, partisans meet the criteria of informed engagement in politics. 
They are more likely to vote, donate money, and campaign for political candidates. There 
is also strong correlation between the strength of individuals’ partisanship and their 
political knowledge and involvement (Abramowitz, 2010; Levendusky, 2009; Mutz, 
2006). Given the benefits of partisanship on voter turnout, political knowledge, and 
overall political participation, some scholars in social studies have openly wondered 
whether social studies courses should actively encourage students to develop partisan 
identities. Hess and McAvoy (2014), for example, float the idea of encouraging 
partisanship as a way to get students more interested and involved in politics. In such a 
classroom, part of the teacher’s role in political socialization would involve having 
students reflect on which political party best reflects their values and opinions. Evidence 
from multi-national studies supports the contention that partisanship is correlated with 
desirable behaviors. The 2009 study from the International Association for the Evaluation 
of Educational Achievement (IEA) found that liking a political party was correlated with 
students’ intended political participation (Schulz et al., 2010). This correlation exists 
despite evidence that political parties are among the least trusted political institutions 
(Schulz et al., 2010; Torney-Purta & Amadeo, 2003).  
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Drawbacks of Partisanship 
If voter turnout and political knowledge were the only measures of democratic 
citizenship, then partisanship would be unequivocally desirable in the eyes of social 
studies educators. Partisanship, however, is often associated with cognitive and social 
biases that fall short of the deliberative democratic model.  
Motivated reasoning is a collection of processes that guide individuals’ thinking, 
many of which take place outside of conscious awareness. As the name implies, these 
processes are driven by some motive, usually a particular belief or feeling driving 
individuals towards a particular conclusion. In a review of early research on biased 
reasoning processes, Kunda (1990) concludes that individuals without any substantial 
interest or knowledge about a particular issue can reason fairly evenhandedly, especially 
if they are encouraged to be accurate in their judgments. As Kunda notes, however, if 
individuals are motivated by prior opinions, partisan allegiances, personal friendships, 
moral convictions, or other such factors, these may push them towards one side of a 
given issue. In such cases, their reasoning serves more to rationally justify their existing 
conclusions than to evaluate alternatives. The motives that drive these biases often occur 
without individuals being aware of them. Lodge and Tabor (Lodge & Tabor, 2013; Tabor 
& Lodge, 2016) focus on the unconscious elements of motivated reasoning. According to 
their model, John Q. Public (JPQ), unconscious cues that occur early in the political 
thought process can direct conscious, explicit thinking in very profound ways. Lodge and 
Tabor argue that these subtle processes are often so powerful that explicit thoughts 
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individuals have about politics are often rationalizations of conclusions reached through 
entirely automatic processing.  
 As most motivated reasoning research is conducted on adults, it is legitimate to 
ask whether or not young people have enough experience with controversial social or 
political issues to have developed any directional motivated bias. Although few 
researchers have investigated biased thinking in K-12 students, their findings support the 
existence of motivated reasoning in young students. Klaczynski and colleagues 
(Klaczynski, 1997, 2000, 2001; Klaczynski & Gordon, 1996; Klaczynski, Gordon, & 
Fauth, 1997; Klaczyski & Narasimhan, 1998) have found that children from elementary 
through high school display a number of reasoning biases, many of which are driven by 
their prior beliefs on issues. Chief among their findings is that children, like adults, are 
prone to process information differently depending on how much they agree or disagree 
with it. Information that agrees with children’s preexisting positions is generally accepted 
and not questioned, while counter-attitudinal information is carefully processed and 
discredited.  
 There is also a social component to biased reasoning. As Haidt (2012) notes, 
individuals often mistrust and discount messages coming from individuals perceived as 
different or part of an out-group. Attempts at discussing issues across ideological 
boundaries often fall flat because there is not sufficient social connection to overcome the 
ideological differences. Individuals whose ideas are critiqued by strangers or out-group 
members are likely to become defensive and disregard or actively resist the critique, 
regardless of its merit. Being critiqued by a friend, colleague, or other in-group member, 
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however, is a different experience. Because of the stronger social bonds present in the 
latter situation, the recipient of the critique is more likely to be receptive.  
It is becoming increasingly difficult to build bonds across social and political 
difference. Some of that difficulty stems from basic social and economic forces. Bishop 
(2008) and Mutz (2006) note that a decades-long trend of demographic sorting has 
impacted the political landscape of the United States. As individuals move around the 
country, they tend to settle in neighborhoods among people similar to themselves. 
Although people’s housing choices are usually not political, a consequence of the sorting 
process has been increased political homogeneity within communities. As Mutz (2006) 
argues, individuals in such communities will rarely have opportunities to encounter 
political difference. Individuals who are rarely exposed to political difference may have a 
difficult time imagining how reasonable people could disagree with their views. While 
the consistent reinforcement of a single political perspective is generally good for 
political engagement, it also tends to impede deliberative engagement across difference. 
 Media and technology also make it easier for individuals to seek reinforcement 
and avoid challenges to their political perspectives. Noting broad suspicion of media bias, 
Iyengar and Hahn (2009) find that partisans prefer news sources perceived as friendly 
(Fox News for Republicans, CNN and National Public Radio for Democrats) even for 
stories that were non-controversial or apolitical. Further, Levendusky (2013) finds that 
slanted media outlets tend to increase partisans’ mistrust of the opposing party. Metzger, 
Hartsell, and Flanagin (2015) note that preferring partisan slanted news is likely rooted in 
   29 
 
perceptions of out-party sources as less credible (as opposed to individuals wanting to 
avoid information that disagrees with their opinions). 
Is it Possible to Have the Best of Both Worlds? 
 Given that social studies teachers tend to hold both engagement and open-
mindedness as ideals, it is of interest whether there are circumstances under which 
individuals can enjoy the civic benefits of partisanship (increased information and 
engagement) without the drawbacks (bias, mistrust, and intellectual isolationism). Much 
of the literature reviewed thus far does not grant much hope for the ability to be openly 
deliberative about politics when strong identities are involved. Some literature, however, 
suggests that such engagement is possible.  
Generally, the perception of information as an antidote to bias is not supported by 
political psychology. Studies have found, however, that there is a point when even a 
biased person can no longer ignore information that contradicts their beliefs. Redlawsk, 
Civettini, and Emerson (2010) found that individuals who supported a fictional candidate 
were resistant to changing their opinion when presented with negative information about 
that candidate. With continued exposure to negative information, many individuals 
initially resistant to opinion change later changed their candidate preference. Redlawsk et 
al. suggest that the cognitive resources needed to continually justify existing preferences 
in the face of negative information eventually deplete and individuals will adjust their 
preference. In short, it may be a difficult process, but it is possible to “wear down” 
individuals engaging in motivated reasoning or other forms of biased thinking about 
politics.  
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 While Redlawsk and colleagues’ experiment was conducted with a fictional 
campaign, Lavine, Johnstone, and Steenbergen (2012) present evidence that prolonged 
exposure to negative information may promote what they term partisan ambivalence. 
Ambivalent partisans are engaged voters who profess loyalty to a political party but do 
not exhibit the same partisan voting records that other party loyalists do. Using numerous 
large scale election studies, such as the ANES, Lavine et al. found that ambivalent 
behavior tends to rise in elections where a particular political party experiences a lot of 
negative press. For example, relatively close to the 2006 Congressional elections, the 
Republican Party was subject to a number of scandals, including financial malfeasance 
and sexual abuse of minors (Lavine et al., 2012). Combined with the unpopularity of the 
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, many self-identified Republicans ended up voting 
Democrat or not voting at all, leading to large Democratic victories.  
Discussion/Deliberation and Open-Minded Engagement 
 Advocates of deliberation as a means of democratic decision-making believe that 
the deliberative process represents the best and fairest process available. Decisions made 
through deliberation, so the theory goes, should be fairer and less prone to bias than other 
decisions. However, critics of deliberation, such as Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002), 
argue that deliberative exercises fall short of these idealistic predictions.  
The outcomes of deliberation may be partially dependent on the participants 
themselves. Groups with uniform demographics or opinions may deliberate differently 
and have different results than those in heterogeneous groups. For example, Schkade, 
Sunstein, and Hastie (2007) note that uniform opinion groups have their opinions 
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reinforced and may even become more extreme as a result of deliberation. Ethnically 
homogenous groups may also have their own perspectives reinforced as a result of 
deliberations. Goldberg (2013) found that homogenous groups of Israeli students more 
strongly reinforced their own identities in a deliberation than did heterogeneous groups.  
The evidence is more mixed when groups are not uniform. Some researchers find 
mixed-opinion groups do not polarize (e.g., Martin, Hewstone, Martin, & Gardikiotis, 
2008), whereas others find the opposite (e.g., Gastil, Black, & Muscovitz, 2008). The 
relative strength of a given political opinion during a discussion/deliberation may also 
matter. Noelle-Neumann (1974) argues that individuals in the minority opinion may be 
subject to a spiral of silence, wherein the unpopular opinions are not voiced for fear of 
social repercussions. Later studies on spiral of silence (e.g., Hayes, Matthes, & Eveland 
Jr., 2011) indicate that hesitancy to express opinions is also a function of individual 
dispositions and strength of political opinion. Despite the mixed evidence, there is a 
consensus that individuals are impacted by group composition, though the nature of how 
group factors interact with individual factors is still uncertain.  
Politics in the Classroom 
Despite the view that student partisans are quite rare, it is common to view 
students as developing civic and political beings. As such, researchers often encourage 
the discussion of controversial political issues in the classroom. This section examines 
the literature on social studies pedagogy, classroom environment, and teacher’s beliefs, 
focusing on potential applications to partisanship.  
Pedagogical Choices 
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Classroom discussions2 in social studies appear to be the most highly regarded 
vehicle for practicing democratic skills. Parker and Hess (2001) emphasize that good 
discussion results in deeper understanding of both the subject at hand and the process of 
generating shared knowledge. Such understandings come by exposing participants’ views 
to examination by the group. While the precise format of a given discussion may vary, 
the process of group consideration of varying ideas remains central. Wilen (2003) 
delineates several qualities of discussion that are in direct alignment with democratic 
values, including being able to freely express ideas, problem solve, and disagree with 
prevailing opinions. Less explicitly, there is a preference for rational discourse, tolerance, 
and fairness present in most classroom discussions. In addition, many scholars recognize 
the need for balance between the freedom to express oneself openly and respect for others 
in the group.  
 Good discussion pedagogy pays dividends in terms of student knowledge and 
participation. A host of research indicates that students who discuss controversial issues 
in their classes show more political efficacy, interest, knowledge, trust, participation 
(both community and electoral), perspective taking, and tolerance (see, for example, 
Andolina, Jenkins, Zukin, & Keeter, 2003; Avery, Levy, & Simmons, 2013; Barr et al., 
2015; Campbell, 2008; Conover & Searing, 2000; Hahn, 1998; Schulz, Ainley, Fraillon, 
Kerr, & Losito, 2010; Torney-Purta, Lehmann, Oswald, & Schulz, 2001). Although these 
benefits are substantial, many of them are also correlated with increased partisan feeling 
                                                
2 The online discussions in this study are intended to be deliberative, though much of the 
literature on in Social Studies Education refers to discussion more broadly. As 
deliberation is a type of discussion, it can be assumed that the works discussed here are 
applicable to deliberations.  
   33 
 
and behavior. As noted above, many of these behaviors ultimately end up being 
correlated with increased partisanship when measured in adults.  
Clark and Avery (2016) call for further research examining the psychological 
elements of controversial issues discussion. Despite the benefits of discussions, few 
studies have distinguished between the desirable behaviors and processes that drive those 
behaviors. Taking voting as a basic example, the same action (casting a ballot) can be 
driven by vastly different motivations, some in alignment with democratic education’s 
goals and some not. An individual, for example, could vote because they considered the 
issues and concluded that a particular candidate best represented their interest. Another 
individual could vote for that same candidate simply because that candidate represents 
the party their parents support. While both individuals have voted, many civic educators 
would place higher value on the actions of the former than of the latter. Research is 
needed to examine deeper cognitive, affective, and motivational elements of civic 
participation so as to better understand how they are impacted (or not) by education. 
School/Classroom Environment 
While pedagogy is important, the climate in which discussion takes place is 
equally important. Studies both within the United States and internationally conclude that 
open classroom climate for discussion is influential in promoting civic engagement and 
knowledge (Campbell, 2008; Niemi & Junn, 1998; Quintellier & Hooghe, 2013; Torney-
Purta et al., 2001). An open climate for discussion includes, among other criteria, student 
comfort, exposure to multiple perspectives, and teacher encouragement of discussion.  
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As noted earlier, group composition is important. Diverse student groupings 
facilitate exposure to diverse perspectives. Goldberg’s (2013) study of Israeli youth found 
that ethnically diverse groups expressed much broader historical perspectives after 
discussion than ethnically homogenous groups. Stoddard and Chen (2016) studied small 
groups of 18- to 22-year-olds discussing a film about Guantanamo Bay. They found that 
ideologically diverse discussion groups generally raised more issues and had deeper 
discussions than homogenous groups. In general, if teachers want to expose their students 
to more diverse viewpoints, purposefully selected groups tend to be better than student-
selected groups.  
Teacher Politics 
Teachers have a right to their own political allegiances and judgments, though 
how much of either they should share with their students is debatable. Despite a general 
trend in the research favoring impartial teacher disclosure (Hess, 2009; Hess & McAvoy, 
2015; James, 2009; Kelly, 1986), many studies document teachers’ unwillingness to do 
so (Miller-Lane, 2006; Wilson, Hass, Laughlin, & Sunal, 2002). Teachers typically offer 
a variety of reasons for such reluctance, with fear of unduly influencing students’ 
thinking and fear of community or administrative sanctions usually topping the list (Hess, 
2009; Hess & McAvoy, 2015; McAvoy & Hess, 2013).  
 Naturally, there are many different ways to make one’s political feelings known. 
Kelly (1986) outlines four stances that teachers typically take on opinion disclosure. 
Exclusive neutrality reflects a commitment to avoiding controversy at all cost. Such 
teachers will not disclose their beliefs and will avoid all issues that could spark 
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disagreement. Exclusive partiality is a commitment to teaching a certain perspective. 
These teachers will teach only what they perceive are the correct views on all 
controversial topics. Teachers who do not wish to disclose their views but want to tackle 
controversial issues favor neutral impartiality. In such classrooms, students are 
encouraged to express themselves and disagree with one another, but the teacher will 
carefully guard own their opinion. Committed impartiality involves making one’s 
opinions known but also expressing a commitment to make sure all sides of an issue are 
heard. Most educational researchers view this last category as the best reflection of 
deliberative democratic ideals, though as noted earlier, many educators in the field 
commonly favor neutral impartiality for fear of exerting undue influence on students’ 
judgments.  
 Not all means of disclosure, however, are intentional. Many times, teachers betray 
their political leanings through off-hand comments, actions, or reactions. For example, 
Niemi and Niemi (2007) observed teachers making comments that implied or directly 
stated opinions on political matters, despite professing a commitment to remain neutral 
and allow students to make up their own minds. James (2009) argues that even teachers 
careful about their comments can express bias. Regardless of whether teachers’ beliefs 
are disclosed, they are expressed through choice of topics or instructional methods. In 
James’ estimation, it is better for teachers to openly declare their positionality at the 
outset and allow students to openly question the beliefs that drive pedagogical choices. 
Similarly, Journell (2011, 2016) notes that teachers’ decisions to include or omit certain 
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materials often reflect their political beliefs by unfairly balancing the information 
available for student consideration.  
 Previous civic education research on teacher disclosure generally focuses on 
teacher choices and students’ stated responses to those choices. While there is recognition 
that teachers can express bias in subtle ways, there has been little discussion about the 
ways in which students could potentially respond to disclosure with bias of their own. 
Though teachers may fear influencing students, this view neglects that many students 
come into the classroom already having formed political identities. Research on college 
students indicates that student political identity can profoundly shape how they react to 
teacher political disclosure. Work by Kelly-Woessner and Woessner (2008) and Weiler 
(2009) indicates a relationship between college students’ and professors’ differences in 
political beliefs and subsequent course evaluations. A key finding of this research is that 
students who perceive large gaps between the professor and themselves in terms of 
partisanship report less motivation and learning in the class. In other words, the stakes 
surrounding differences between teacher and student political identities could potentially 
be quite high.  
Summary and Gaps in the Literature 
In this section, I have reviewed the normative literature about citizenship and 
deliberative democracy, as well as the role of education in facilitating engaged and 
thoughtful citizenship in students. I have also identified the importance of student identity 
in shaping educational experiences. Partisan identity, despite being relatively under-
researched in social studies education, may constitute a salient social identity for 
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students, which in turn may influence their behavior and perceptions of the classroom. 
Lastly, I reviewed the literature on discussion, classroom climate, and opinion disclosure 
in social studies classrooms to identify ways in which political opinions/discussions 
impact student political socialization.  
Despite all the research on the relationship between civic education and 
citizenship, very little research has examined the differences between partisan and non-
partisan students (for exceptions, see Hess & McAvoy, 2014; 2015). Differences between 
partisan and non-partisan adults have been extensively explored in political 
science/political psychology literature, but there is relatively little research examining 
whether these differences manifest themselves in young people who are still developing 
physically, emotionally, and politically.  
Moving beyond baseline differences, little is known about how partisanship 
impacts the nature of student discussions and deliberations. Again, extensive research on 
adults indicates that they are susceptible to numerous biases (such as motivated 
reasoning) when discussing politics, but the deliberative literature has produced mixed 
results regarding the impacts of group political composition. Research on discussions 
involving homogenous and heterogeneous groups in the classroom (Goldberg, 2013) 
suggests that there are differences between the two, though more research is needed to 
examine these differences in discussions of political controversies. Further, deeper 
examination of constructs such as polarization and motivated reasoning is needed to 
determine whether these tendencies, which largely run contrary to expectations of good 
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citizens (see Campaign for the Civic Mission of Schools, 2011), can be moderated by 
teachers’ pedagogical choices.  
Lastly, as partisanship often constitutes a lens through which individuals view 
social and political topics, the impact of partisanship on the classroom experience as a 
whole merits investigation. Research on teacher disclosure of political opinions at the 
high school level generally favors open disclosure with a commitment to neutrality. 
Deeper understanding of the specific cognitive and social impacts that teacher political 
opinions have on students is needed.   
In short, as Clark and Avery (2016) note, the influence of partisanship and 
political disagreement may run deeper than social studies educators realize. In response 
to the gaps in the literature, I focus my inquiry on the following four research questions:  
R1:  Are partisan students different from their non-partisan peers in terms of 
political and civic knowledge, sense of civic efficacy, and perceptions of the 
classroom environment (e.g., climate for discussion, perceptions of classmates, 
and teacher opinion)? 
R2:  Do partisan students behave differently than their non-partisan peers in the 
context of small group deliberations? Does the composition of deliberative groups 
(e.g., partisan unanimity, presence of non-partisan members, presence of 
disagreeing partisans) moderate these behaviors? 
R3: Are partisan and non-partisan students impacted differently by deliberation? 
Specifically, are changes in sense of civic efficacy, opinions about political 
groups (e.g., Democrats, Republicans), or issue opinions different between 
   39 
 
partisans and non-partisans? Does deliberative group composition moderate these 
changes?  
R4: Does the strength of students’ partisanship influence the degree to which they 
consider differing opinions or opposing arguments?  
The study described in the next chapter serves to expand the knowledge base in social 
studies about partisan students and suggest pedagogical strategies that maximize the civic 




















 In the previous chapter, I reviewed literature relevant to student partisanship and 
classroom discussion and identified four lines of inquiry. In this chapter, I describe a 
study of student partisanship in the context of an online deliberation, the results of which 
will be reported in later chapters.  
Research Questions 
Research in social studies education often emphasizes the importance of 
controversial issues discussions in promoting better educational and civic outcomes (e.g., 
higher levels of political knowledge and civic self-efficacy). Social Studies scholars have 
only recently begun to recognize the influence of political partisanship and strong 
political opinions on such discussions and the larger classroom environment (Hess & 
McAvoy, 2014, 2015; McAvoy & Hess, 2013). While these studies have made important 
contributions to understanding social studies education in divided political times, much 
work remains to fully understand how students’ partisanship (or lack thereof) impacts 
their civic education. In order to more fully explore the issue of student partisanship and 
its influence on discussions and deliberations, I conducted a study of student 
deliberations in online forums. In the course of this study, I pursued the following 
research questions:  
R1:  Are partisan students different from their non-partisan peers in terms of 
political and civic knowledge, sense of political efficacy, and perceptions of the 
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classroom environment (e.g., climate for discussion, perceptions of classmate and 
teacher opinion)? 
R2:  Do partisan students behave differently than their non-partisan peers in the 
context of small group deliberations? Does the composition of deliberative groups 
(e.g., partisan unanimity or non-unanimity) moderate these behaviors? 
R3: Are partisan and non-partisan students impacted differently by deliberation? 
Specifically, are changes in sense of political efficacy, opinions about political 
groups (e.g., Democrats, Republicans), or issue opinions different between 
partisans and non-partisans? Does deliberative group composition moderate these 
changes?  
R4: Does the strength of students’ partisanship influence the degree to which they 
consider differing opinions or opposing arguments?  
Research Question 1 
Research on adults suggests that partisans tend to differ in many ways from non-
partisans. Partisan adults, likely due to their greater engagement and interest in political 
matters, consistently demonstrate higher levels of political knowledge than comparable 
groups (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Galston, 2001, Hess & McAvoy, 2014). It is 
expected that partisan high school students will also be more engaged with political 
information than their peers. Given partisans’ higher levels of political involvement, it is 
also likely that they will exhibit a greater sense that their participation matters and is 
capable of impacting society (political efficacy). Thus:  
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H1a: Students with partisan identities will have significantly higher political and 
civic knowledge than their non-partisan peers.  
H1b: Students with partisan identities will have significantly higher levels of 
political efficacy than their non-partisan peers.  
Classrooms are complex social spaces where individuals of different backgrounds 
interact. Social identity theory (Tajfel, 1970; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) predicts that 
individuals with salient social identities will seek to distinguish their group from others 
(either through elevating their own group or disparaging other groups). If a partisan 
student perceives their teacher or other students as members of an in-group or out-group, 
it may impact their perceptions of the classroom climate as well. As Kelly-Woessner and 
Woessner (2008) found, the greater differences perceived between their own partisan 
allegiances and those of their classmates and teachers (partisan distance), the lower their 
ratings of the teacher, class, and classmates.  
H1c: There will be a significant, inverse relationship between student/classmate 
partisan distance and perception of open classroom climate.   
H1d: There will be a significant, inverse relationship between student/teacher 
partisan distance and perception of open classroom climate. 
H1e: There will be a significant, inverse relationship between student/teacher 
partisan distance and positive course evaluations.  
Research Question 2 
The environment in which a deliberation takes place can influence individual 
deliberative behaviors. Research on spiral of silence theory (Noelle-Neumann, 1974) 
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indicates that individuals may be reluctant to speak up in discussions if they perceive 
their opinion to be in the minority. Perception of the group opinion climate will likely be 
based off of group feedback to each member’s contributions. It is likely that members of 
the group will decide to adjust their contributions (or not) based on such feedback and the 







It is likely partisans, responding to cues about the opinion climate from their 
group mates, will adjust their levels of partisan opinion expression and participation over 
the course of the deliberation. Therefore:  
H2: There will be an interaction between students’ strength of partisanship and 
their group condition (uniform or mixed) when predicting discussion behaviors.  
Research Question 3 
Civic educators have consistently found that deliberation and other forms of 
discussion have the impact of raising civic efficacy and participation (Galston, 2001; 
Hess & McAvoy, 2014), but little research in K-12 education has examined changes in 











Figure 3.5. Student adaptation to group opinion climate. 
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H3a: Students’ political efficacy should increase following the deliberative 
exercise, regardless of partisanship.  
H3b: Partisan students will become more extreme in their opinions following 
deliberation, as compared to non-partisan students.  
H3c: Partisan students will become more affectively polarized following 
deliberation, as compared to non-partisan students.  
The composition of the discussion group may impact how much opinion and identity 
affirmation students receive. Exposure to diverse perspectives tends to promote less 
opinion certainty (Mutz, 2006). It is likely that the discussion condition will moderate the 
extent to which students have their opinions and identities affirmed. Figure 3.2 illustrates 
the hypothesized moderating relationship for both opinions and partisan identity.  
H3d: Deliberation condition (uniform or mixed) will moderate the changes 



















Research Question 4 
As much as students are exhorted to be aware of their own biases when 
considering information, much research (e.g., Klaczynski, 2000; Lodge & Tabor, 2013; 
Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979) suggests that genuine neutrality is difficult to achieve. 
Biased assimilation of information is a significant component of such subjective thinking. 
When individuals encounter information, they tend to discount or seek to refute 
arguments and ideas in opposition to their current position and pay more attention to 
information that supports it. In other words, political identity may act as a filter, directing 















Figure 3.6. Moderating impact of deliberation condition on reinforcement of opinions 
and political identity. 








Research on biased assimilation suggests that, after students gather information 
on a topic, partisan students will likely have an imbalance of information in support of 
their chosen side. Non-partisan or independent students would be expected to be more 
even-handed in their information acquisition. Therefore:  
H4a: Partisan students will exhibit a significantly higher argument repertoire 
score than non-partisan students prior to discussion.  
H4b: Partisan students will be significantly less likely to incorporate new 
information into their understanding of the issue following deliberation than non-
partisan students. 
H4c: Partisan students will be less likely to recall information that supports an 
opposing side of the issue at the end of the term.  
Study Setting and Participants 
 The population of interest for this study is high school seniors (17- to 18-year-
olds). Research suggests that the development of political and partisan identity usually 
begins during the teenage years (Converse, 1969; Jennings & Markus, 1984). High 













Figure 7.3. Political identity acting as an informational filter. 
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school students. In the state where the research takes place, it is typical for 12th graders to 
take economics and/or government courses during their senior year. 
 In selecting participating schools, I relied on a professional network of educators 
within the state where the research takes place. Leaders of professional organizations and 
connections at the University of Minnesota recommended educators in the state that 
typically use deliberations of controversial issues, or would be interested in incorporating 
them into the curriculum. Based on these recommendations, I approached potential 
teachers to describe the study and began the process of securing permission to conduct 
research in their schools. Due to the focus of this study, the relative amount of political 
diversity found in a given school was the primary consideration in selecting school sites. 
Schools where very little difference of political opinion could be expected were excluded.  
Three teachers agreed to participate in the study, though one site had to be 
dropped because I was unable to secure permission from the school district to conduct 
research in that classroom. The two remaining sites, Loomis High School and Nichols 
High School, were both located in rural communities. At Loomis High School, I observed 
two sections of a course called Democratic Citizenship taught by Ms. Albertson. At 
Nichols High School, three sections of an AP Government course taught by Mr. 
Humphries participated in the study.  
 Loomis High School is located in community of roughly 5,000 residents about an 
hour’s drive from a major metropolitan area in the Midwest. The school has 
approximately 850 students. The vast majority of the student body is White (97%). Ms. 
Albertson, who identifies as a White female, has been teaching for 23 years and has 
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taught the Democratic Citizenship course for the past five years. Democratic Citizenship 
is an elective course focused on the major issues of citizenship and governance in the 
United States. The course frequently features discussions of works by major figures in 
United States history. These works are often related to current events in the class and 
students often watched CNN Student News at the beginning of the hour. Two sections of 
this course, totaling 47 students, participated in the study. 
 Nichols High School is located in a county seat of approximately 24,000 people. 
The student body numbers about 1,400 and consists of 65% White, 22% Hispanic, 8% 
Black, 6% Asian. Mr. Humphries is a White male who has been teaching for 25 years, the 
last 13 of which he has spent teaching the AP Government classes that participated in this 
study (79 students). In addition to his responsibilities at the high school, he teaches at a 
local community college where he is the department chair.  
 Prior to beginning the online discussion, I visited both participating classrooms to 
explain the study and answer any student questions.  During these visits, I observed 
classroom climates and procedures and familiarized myself with the classroom and 
school environment. I was also able to address any implementation issues, and hopefully, 
increase student enthusiasm for the project. At both sites, the study took place between 
August and November of 2016 and wrapped up prior to Election Day 2016.  
 Table 3.1 provides a breakdown of the students participating in the study. The two 
sites provided the desired diversity of political identification among students, though 
there are low levels of ethnic/racial diversity. The limitations of the sample will be 
discussed further below.  




Sample Characteristics (n = 126)	
School 	  
Loomis	  47 
Nichols	  79 
Gender	  
Male	   51 
Female	   75 
Race/Ethnicity	  
White	     108 
Hispanic 6 
Asian/Pacific Islander 1 
Multi-Racial/Multi-Ethnic 3 
Did Not Disclose 8 
Political Affiliation  
Republican   40 
Democrat   48 
Independent   19 
Other/Did Not Disclose   19 
 
Procedure 
As part of an assignment in their classes, students researched a controversial 
political issue and participated in an online discussion in small groups. In addition to that 
assignment, all students completed three questionnaires (Q1 prior to deliberation, Q2 
after deliberation, and Q3 two weeks later) and purposefully selected students were asked 
to participate in follow-up interviews. Using the questionnaires, transcripts from the 
online deliberations, and interview data, I will assess the impacts of partisanship (or lack 
thereof) on students in social studies classrooms.  
Pre-Discussion 
Students were assigned a controversial topic (“Stop and Frisk” policies at Loomis 
High School and raising taxes at Nichols High School) and given class time to conduct 
research. Prior to their deliberations, students took Q1 (see below), providing baseline 
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measures of political efficacy, issue opinion, opinions on politics in general, and 
background information on the student (demographics, previous experiences in social 
studies classes, etc.). Based on their responses to political opinion questions, I assigned 
them to small discussion groups of three or four students using stratified random 
sampling. Some students were placed in mixed-partisanship groups, while others were 
placed in uniform partisan identity groups (all Republicans, all Democrats, or all 
Independents). Each participating school conducted separate deliberations and students 
were assigned to groups within their own school, though not necessarily within their own 
class period.  
During Discussion 
Students participated in an asynchronous online discussion using a threaded 
forum. Deliberations took place over the course of approximately one week. During that 
time, students were instructed to present information and explore the different options 
available (e.g., What do we know about the issue? What are the perspectives of various 
groups? What solutions have been proposed already?). Students were also asked to post, 
at minimum, one main thread and one reply to another student’s thread.  
Post-Discussion 
Following the discussion, students took Q2. Additionally, 11 students were 
selected for interviews about their experiences in the deliberation and in the classroom in 
general. These students were purposefully selected to include a variety of perspectives 
from each discussion condition as well as a balance of gender, ethnic, and partisan 
groups. Because deliberative experiences can be shaped by both the individual (identity, 
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prior experiences, etc.) and social context (deliberative condition, level of agreement with 
the group, etc.) purposeful selection of participants was preferred over random selection 
for comparison over a broader range of experiences. Participating students were 
interviewed individually with 8 students being interviewed in a face-to-face setting and, 
due to scheduling difficulties, another two interviewed over Skype. One student was 
invited and initially accepted an interview invitation, but ultimately decided not to 
participate. All interviews were recorded for later transcription and coding. 
Follow-Up 
Two weeks after their discussion, students were asked to complete Q3 (see 
below). This final questionnaire once again measured political efficacy, issue opinion, 
and thoughts on politics, as well as students’ perceptions of their classmates and teacher.  
Measures/Data Sources 
Student Questionnaires 
The questionnaires provide a means of gathering information about students’ 
demographic and educational backgrounds, as well as the opportunity to capture changes 
in several key measures over the course of the deliberative experience. Below is a 
description of the construct measures in the questionnaires. The specific wording of all of 
the items below can be found in Appendix A.  
Outcome variables. The following variables will serve as statistical outcomes in 
the data analysis.  
Political efficacy (Q1, Q2, Q3). Political efficacy reflects individuals’ sense of 
whether their participation matters and whether they are able to have an impact on the 
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world around them (e.g., People like me don’t have any say about what the government 
does.). Variations of this scale are used in both political science and civic education 
research. In the questionnaires used for this study, students respond to eight statements 
using a 7-point (strongly agree-strongly disagree scale) Likert scale. Higher scores are 
typically associated with higher levels of voting and political engagement. It is common 
to divide political efficacy into internal efficacy (α = .88) and external efficacy (α = .76) 
to assess the degree to which students feel they comprehend politics and are able to 
influence political events, respectively (Niemi, Craig, & Mattei, 1991; Levy, 2011).  
Political and civic knowledge (Q1). The knowledge battery consists of seven 
questions modeled after work by Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996). Five questions cover 
basic civic and political knowledge (e.g., Which political party is more conservative at 
the national level? What size majority in both houses of Congress is needed to override a 
presidential veto?). The remaining two questions cover current political events and, as the 
study took place in an election year, asked about developments in the presidential 
campaign that occur close to the start of the study. Political and civic knowledge 
questions are often averaged into a scale (e.g., Capella, Price, & Nir, 2002) to represent 
participants’ general level of political understanding (α =.82).  
Classroom climate scale (Q1). The open classroom scale (Torney-Purta, 
Lehmann, Oswald, Schultz, 2001) captures the degree to which students feel comfortable 
expressing their opinions in the classroom. Students respond to six statements about their 
classroom on a 1-5 Likert scale (e.g., Teachers encourage students to make up their own 
minds.). Open classroom climate (α = .83) has been frequently used in international 
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civics assessments (Schulz, Ainley, Fraillon, Kerr, & Losito, 2010) and has been shown 
to be associated with student willingness to participate in discussions as well as student 
achievement in civics.  
Perceptions of classmates and teacher (Q3). Student partisanship may impact 
how they perceive others in the classroom, particularly the teacher and other students. In 
studies at the college level, students who perceive differences between themselves and 
their professors typically give lower course evaluations and report less engagement and 
learning (Kelly-Woessner & Woessner, 2008). Students completed a 15-question course 
evaluation form asking them to evaluate their course and teacher (e.g., How would you 
rate your teacher’s knowledge of the course material? Overall, I would recommend this 
course to other students.) The evaluation form was divided into two scales: evaluation of 
the teacher (α = .86) and evaluation of the course (α = .78). Students also placed their 
teachers and their classmates on both partisan (Republican/Democrat) and ideological 
(conservative/liberal) scales.  
Perceived disagreement and opinion change (Q2). Two questions have been 
used by Wojcieszak (2011) to measure the impacts of perceived disagreement on opinion 
polarization. The perceived disagreement question asks students to mark (in 10% time 
increments) how often they found themselves disagreeing with their group. Students self-
assessed whether their opinion changed during the course of the deliberation. Students 
mark their opinion movement on a scale, marking the left side of the scale if they moved 
away from their previous stance and the right side of the scale of if their opinion was 
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reinforced or strengthened. Students whose opinions were not changed mark the middle 
of the scale.   
Affective polarization (Q1, Q2, Q3). Students rated political groups (Republicans, 
Democrats, conservatives, liberals) using a feeling thermometer. Each group is given a 0 
to 100 rating, with lower scores representing negative feelings and higher scores 
representing positive feelings. Differences in student ratings of Republicans/Democrats 
and conservatives/liberals can be used as a measure of affective polarization (Iyengar et 
al., 2012). Students with a large difference between their preferred political party or 
ideological group (if they have one) and the other party can be said to be more affectively 
polarized than students with small differences between their ratings. This measure was 
tracked over the course of the deliberative exercise to determine whether deliberation 
across the various grouping conditions impacts affect towards political out-groups.  
Argument repertoire (Q1, Q2, Q3). Argument repertoire (Capella, Prince, Nir, 
2002) captures both student issue opinion and their ability to present arguments both for 
and against their position. The measure asks students to state their position and up to six 
reasons that support that position. They were then asked to state up to six reasons a 
person who disagreed with their position would give. The measure serves as an 
assessment of student learning throughout the course of the deliberation process. In 
addition, comparing the number of reasons a student gives for and against their position 
measures the degree to which they engaged in biased assimilation of information (Lord, 
Ross, & Lepper, 1979).  
   55 
 
  Predictor/control variables. The following measures were included on the 
questionnaires to serve as predictors or statistical controls during data analysis. 
Student partisanship and political orientation (Q1, Q2, Q3). Students placed 
themselves on 7-point party (Strong Republican-Strong Democrat) and ideology 
(Strongly conservative-Strongly liberal) scales. In the case of partisan identification, 
students’ responses to two questions determined their placement on the 7-point partisan 
scale. The first question asked whether they identify as Republican, Independent, 
Democrat, or another party. Students marking the first three options received a question 
asking whether they consider themselves a strong or not very strong partisan (for 
Republicans and Democrats) or whether they lean towards one party or another (for 
Independents). These scales are then collapsed to create measures of party and 
ideological strength ranging from 0-3 (e.g., Strong Republicans and Strong Democrats 
coded as 3 on a party strength measure, moderate liberals and conservatives coded as 2 
on the ideological strength measure). 
Partisan social identity (Q1, Q2, Q3). Based on student responses to their 
partisan affiliation, they received a list of questions asking how strongly they identify 
with their party of choice (Republican, Democrat, or Independent). These seven questions 
provide an indication of how strongly a student’s partisan identity influences their self-
concept (Huddy, Mason, Aarøe, 2015). Students responded on a scale from 1 (Not at all) 
to 4 (A great deal), creating a score from 7-28. The responses were summed to create 
scales for Republicans (α = .91), Democrats (α = .89), and Independents (α = .90).  
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Civic education experiences index (Q1). This index is adapted from a survey 
conducted by the Commission on Youth Voting and Civic Engagement (2013). It consists 
of six questions (α = .74) that ask about students’ prior educational experiences with 
discussion pedagogy, service projects, or other forms of quality civic learning. As higher 
amounts of quality civic education experiences are correlated with desirable civic 
behaviors, such as increased participation and informed voting (Kahne, Crow, & Lee, 
2013; Kawashima-Ginsberg & Levine, 2014), it is important to control for students’ prior 
educational experiences when examining their discussion behaviors. Also, the 
relationship between quality civic education pedagogies and the development of 
partisanship is largely unexplored. Prior civic experiences may prove influential in the 
strength of partisan belief and/or polarization.  
School democratic climate (Q1). This measure indicates the degree to which 
students feel their voice is heard in the school at large. It consists of four questions (α = 
.73) measuring whether students feel that they can influence decisions at their school, 
whether students are free to disagree with teachers, and whether they are part of a caring 
community.  
Community and school participation (Q1). The community (seven questions, α = 
.62) and school (five questions, α = .70) participation indices measure student 
involvement in activities both in and out of school. Both of these indices are adapted 
from the IEA questionnaires (Schulz et al., 2010). Activity involvement is generally 
correlated with students’ civic involvement later in life.  
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Parental and peer discussion (Q1). Parents are very influential in the civic 
development of young people and often, whether implicitly or explicitly, pass on their 
political habits and leanings to their children. Peers, too, are important in the political 
development of young people. Peer social networks serve to encourage political 
identification and involvement (Sinclair, 2012). These two questions, adapted from the 
Commission on Youth Voting and Civic Knowledge questionnaire (2013) asked how 
often students discuss politics or social issues with their parents/guardians and peers.  
Perceived political polarization (Q1, Q2, Q3). Perceived political polarization 
measures the degree to which students perceive divisions between the two major political 
parties. Students responded to three questions (α = .78) about their perceptions of partisan 
differences in ideology and how they think the parties feel about one another (e.g., Do 
you feel that Republicans and Democrats trust each other?). The public often perceives 
more ideological polarization among politicians than there actually is (Levendusky & 
Malhotra, 2015), though little research has addressed whether these misperceptions exist 
among high school students. Controlling for perceived polarization will reduce the 
chance that changes in student affective polarization following deliberation will be 
attributable to students’ perceptions of politics outside of the deliberation.  
 Demographic controls (Q1). Students will be asked to identify their gender 
(male, female, other), race/ethnicity, and socioeconomic status (using the IEA study 
proxy of number of books in the home – see Schulz et al., 2010). There may be important 
differences in political behavior at a young age among demographic groups. For example, 
Hooghe and Stolle (2004) identify differences in intended political expression among 
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boys and girls, with boys being more likely to anticipate joining a political party and 
support more radical forms of political action. In order to see if the impact of other 
predictor variables is different across demographic groups, interaction terms were tested 
in the models as necessary.  
Discussion Forum Posts 
Although most student deliberations take place face-to-face within the classroom, 
political learning and communication increasingly takes place online, especially among 
young people. Online forums were chosen for this study because they offer similar 
quality to face-to-face discussions (Guiller, Durndell, & Ross, 2008), provide safer 
environments for participation and opinion expression (Busbin, 2013; Clark, Bordwell, & 
Avery, 2015; Ho & McLeod, 2008), and represent a relatively understudied aspect of 
student discussions.  
I worked with the teachers in each school to determine a discussion topic that 
would fit with their curriculums and was relevant to the political climate at the time of the 
study (see Appendix B). In the case of Loomis High School, Ms. Albertson and I settled 
on the topic of “Stop and Frisk” policies, given that it connected with their study of rights 
in class and had been a topic at one of the 2016 presidential debates. The specific prompt 
for discussion was “Stop and Frisk should be adopted nationwide as a means of reducing 
crime.” At Nichols High School, the government course was studying the structures of 
government and the issues of taxation and income inequality were prominent features of 
the 2016 presidential campaign. Mr. Humphries and I settled on the prompt, “Taxes 
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should be raised to more evenly distribute income and better fund government 
programs.” 
Student posts in the online deliberation forum were archived and coded using a 
scheme adapted from Stromer-Galley (2007). The rationale for choosing this scheme is 
that it allows for assessing deliberation through both the group and individual lenses. 
Coding took place in two stages. Stage one coded each contribution from the speaker (in 
the case of the present research, a post or reply to the deliberative forum) in terms of four 
categories: problem, meta-talk, process, and social. Problem talk reflects students’ 
consideration of the topic and can be subdivided into questions, opinions, agreements, 
disagreements, and factual statements. Meta-talk refers to attempts to summarize or 
characterize the content of the deliberation and includes statements of consensus (“It 
seems we all agree that…”), conflict (“We still can’t agree on…”), and clarification. 
Process comments express participants’ thoughts on either the online environment or the 
deliberative process in general. Such comments could praise or criticize the activity or 
raise technical issues with forum. Lastly, social talk, designed to build community, 
consists of greetings, goodbyes, apologies, praise, and other similar talk.  
In stage two of the coding, each instance of the four was broken down into 
specific types of contributions. For example, a typical student problem talk statement 
could read: “I disagree with Dan. Previous minimum wage hikes haven’t resulted in huge 
reductions in the number of jobs.” This statement, though two sentences, would be coded 
as a single thought in Stromer-Galley’s scheme because the two sentences are directed to 
a previous point made by Dan. As the statement discusses the issue (income inequality), 
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it would be coded in stage one as problem talk. During stage two, it would be further 
divided into a disagreement and a factual statement. Table 3.2 provides examples of 
problem talk statements coded from the two discussions.  
Table 3.2 
 
Examples of Problem Talk Statements Coded Using Stromer-Galley’s Coding Scheme  
Statement Coding 
“I completely agree with you. Only people 
who have something they’re hiding would 
be offended about the searching.” 
 
Problem Talk: Agreement; 
Argumentation 
“Another study wrote that of the people 
who were stopped, 90% of them were 
Black or Latino. And of that 90%, 88% 
had done nothing wrong.” 
 
Problem Talk: Supporting Fact 
“…your GPA is in the top third…of all 
GPA’s. Now imagine if you were required 
to forfeit a portion of the GPA you have 
earned so that it could be given to a 
student on the bottom end of the spectrum. 
Would you be pleased to use this adjusted 
GPA for college applications and 
scholarships?” 
 
Problem Talk: Argumentation 
“I believe that taxes should be raised to 
benefit citizens and the community. 
Although I think that raise in taxes should 
be targeted more towards the wealthier 
people.” 
 
Problem Talk: Opinion 
 
Following coding, statements of each type were tallied both at the individual and 
group levels. For the individual level, each participant has a tally of specific types of 
comments (opinions, arguments, questions, factual statements, 
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agreements/disagreements, etc.) as well as a tally of each broader category (problem talk, 
meta-talk, etc.).  
Student Interviews 
Following the completion of the online deliberation and the administration of Q2, 
roughly 10% of the students who took the surveys were selected for follow-up interviews 
(11 students). Data from the interviews helped elaborate upon data from the 
questionnaires as well as provide additional details about the student political 
deliberations unable to be captured via survey. 
  Interviews were semi-structured (see Appendix C) and focused on students’ 
experiences during the deliberation as well as their feelings about politics and political 
discussion in general (e.g., “Tell me more about what you were thinking when you wrote 
this post. How comfortable were you sharing your ideas with the group? How do you feel 
about politics/politicians/political parties?”). Following transcription of the interviews, I 
used a grounded-theory approach (Strauss & Corbin, 1998) to code the data. An initial 
open coding phase was used to identify key themes and ideas expressed by students. 
These themes were then organized and potential relationships among the data, both 
quantitative and qualitative, were explored. The data from the interviews was triangulated 
with data from student questionnaires and deliberation posts to reinforce or revise the 
interpretation of student experiences during the deliberative exercise. 
Teacher Questionnaire 
The teacher questionnaires asked questions about typical pedagogies employed in 
the classroom as well as capture the teachers’ views on politics, discussion of politics in 
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the classroom, and political partisanship. Data from this questionnaire provided insight 
into the classroom environment as well as interesting context to student perceptions of 
the classroom.  
Data Analysis 




Description of Research Question 1, Associated Hypotheses, and Relevant Measures 
Research Question Hypotheses Measures 
R1:  Are partisan 
students different 
from their non-
partisan peers in 
terms of political 
and civic 
knowledge, sense of 
civic efficacy, and 
perceptions of the 
classroom 
environment? 
H1a: Students with partisan identities will 
have significantly higher political and civic 
knowledge than their non-partisan peers.  
H1b: Students with partisan identities will 
have significantly higher political efficacy 
than their non-partisan peers.  
H1c: There will be a significant, inverse 
relationship between student/classmate 
partisan distance and perception of open 
classroom climate.   
H1d: There will be a significant, inverse 
relationship between student/teacher partisan 
distance and perception of open classroom 
climate. 
H1e: There will be a significant, inverse 
relationship between student/teacher partisan 
distance and positive course evaluations.  
H1a: Political and civic 
knowledge scale 
H1b: Political efficacy scale 
H1c: Classroom climate scale; 
perceptions of classmates; 
partisan and ideological self-
placements 
H1d: Classroom climate scale; 
perceptions of teacher; partisan 
and ideological self-placements 
(both teacher and student). 
H1e: Perceptions of classroom 
and teacher. 
 
Research Question 1 
The first research question and its attendant hypotheses address baseline 
differences between partisan and non-partisan students. Using a series of regression 
analyses, I examined partisan identity strength as a key predictor of students’ civic 
knowledge, civic efficacy, and classroom environment.  
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H1a and H1b were tested using multivariate regressions, controlling for 
demographic and educational experiences. Civic knowledge and civic efficacy served as 
outcome variables in a separate regression analyses. The focal predictor in both analyses 
is strength of partisan identity, which was created from students’ responses to the partisan 
identity strength scale. H1a and H1b will be supported if the strength of partisanship 
predictor carries a positive regression coefficient.  
H1c-H1e was tested using the partisan distance variable. Partisan distance is 
calculated by assigning a 1-7 numeric score to points on the partisan placement scale 
(Strong Republican = 1, Strong Democrat = 7), subtracting the students’ placement from 
their perception of the teacher or classmates, and taking the absolute value. The resulting 
score serves as a focal predictor in a regression model. H1c and H1d are tested using a 
single model, using perception of open classroom climate as the outcome variable and 
partisan distance for the teacher and classmates as predictors. In both cases, partisan 
distance was expected to have a negative regression coefficient, indicating that as a 
student perceives greater political differences between themselves and others in the 
classroom, they will perceive the classroom climate as less open.  
 Models testing H1e again used the partisan distance variables as predictors, this 
time with student ratings of the course and teacher as outcome variables. H1e predicts 
that the regression coefficients for partisan distance should be negative, indicating that 
students who perceive political disagreement with their teachers should rate those 
teachers lower on evaluations of teaching.  
 




Description of Research Question 2, Associated Hypotheses, and Relevant Measures 
Research Question Hypothesis Measures 
R2:  Do partisan students 
behave differently than their 
non-partisan peers in the 
context of small group 
deliberations? Does the 
composition of deliberative 
groups (mixed vs. uniform) 
moderate these behaviors? 
H2: There will be a significant 
interaction between students’ 
strength of partisanship and 
their group condition (mixed vs. 
uniform) when predicting 
deliberative behaviors, such as 
stating opinions or asking 
questions.  




Research Question 2 
R2 focuses on the behavior of students within the deliberation exercise and 
questions whether students’ partisanship predicts the type and amount of contributions 
students make to the online forum. Using the tallies of student deliberative behaviors 
from the forum transcripts, I examine if the behaviors of students in the varied conditions 
(uniform or mixed). Student interview comments about their experience with the 
discussion group provide context and depth to the statistical analysis.  
H2 suggests that there will be a statistical interaction between students’ partisan 
identity strength and their discussion condition. Utilizing deliberative condition as a 
categorical variable and setting an interaction term between condition and partisan 
identity strength, I ran a series of regression models on each of the deliberative behaviors 
tallied in the coding process. The interaction term is expected to be significant. In other 
words, a partisan student’s behavior may vary depending on the environment in which 
they discuss. For example, a student in the minority condition with strong partisan 
leanings may feel obligated to defend their point of view while a less stringently partisan 
student in the same condition may feel silenced by being in the minority. Because the 
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research on strength of opinion and deliberative behaviors is so mixed, it is reasonable to 
expect an interaction between partisan strength and deliberation condition, though the 
particular manifestation of that interaction is difficult to anticipate. 
 Given that students are nested in groups over the course of their deliberation, it 
may be appropriate to examine the data using a multi-level model design. Fully 
unconditional models of each outcome (models with no predictors) were constructed to 
determine whether sufficient variance exists between groups to warrant a multi-level 
model. Even if a multi-level model is appropriate, there may be a concern with the 
relatively small sample size involved in the study. Depending on the complexity of the 
models needed to analyze the data, there may not be sufficient degrees of freedom to 
utilize a multi-level design (I will discuss this further in later chapters).  
Table 3.5 
 
Description of Research Question 3, Associated Hypotheses, and Relevant Measures 
Research Question Hypotheses Measures 
R3: Are partisan and non-
partisan students impacted 
differently by deliberation? 
Specifically, are changes in 
sense of political efficacy, 
opinions about political groups 
(e.g., Democrats, Republicans), 
or issue opinions different 
between partisans and non-
partisans? Does deliberative 
group composition moderate 
these changes?  
H3a: Students’ political efficacy 
should increase following the 
deliberative exercise, regardless 
of partisanship.  
H3b: Partisan students will 
become more extreme in their 
opinions following deliberation, 
as compared to non-partisan 
students.  
H3c: Partisan students will 
become more affectively 
polarized following deliberation, 
as compared to non-partisan 
students.  
H3d: Deliberation condition 
(mixed vs. uniform) will 
moderate the changes described 
in H3b and H3c. 
H3a: Political efficacy scale 
(pre- & post-deliberation). 
H3b: Perceived disagreement 
and opinion change measures; 
partisan and ideological self-
placement.  
H3c: Affective polarization 
measure (pre- & post-
deliberation); partisan and 
ideological self-placement. 





Research Question 3  
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 In order to test the outcomes of deliberation relative to political partisanship, a 
series of regression models were fit for pre-and post-deliberation outcomes of political 
efficacy, issue opinion, and affective polarization. H3a can be tested with a multiple 
regression model, using the difference in political efficacy measured on pre- and post-
deliberation questionnaires. Positive differences would indicate an increase in sense of 
efficacy following deliberation. Using the differences in efficacy as an outcome, a 
regression model controls for differences among students to determine whether there was 
a universal increase in efficacy or whether changes are specific to certain groups.  
H3b was tested using the self-report measure of opinion change found on Q2. 
Using the opinion change measure, a regression model was used to assess the impact of 
partisanship on perceived changes of individual opinion. A positive relationship between 
opinion change and strength of partisanship would provide support for H3b, indicating 
that the partisans are more likely to strengthen their opinions following deliberation.  
H3c was tested using the difference between pre- and post-deliberation affective 
polarization scores as an outcome in a regression model. A positive change in affective 
polarization score would indicate that the individual became more affectively polarized 
(either by decreasing their rating of the out-party, raising their rating of the in-party, or 
both). A positive relationship between partisan strength and the change in affective 
polarization will indicate support for the hypothesis.  
H3d was tested by including an interaction term between partisan identity strength 
and discussion condition to the models for H3b and H3c. Significant interaction terms 
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Description of Research Question 4, Associated Hypotheses, and Relevant Measures 
Research Question Hypotheses Measures 
R4: Does the strength of 
students’ partisanship 
influence the degree to which 
they consider differing 
opinions or opposing 
arguments?  
H4a: Partisan students will 
exhibit a significantly higher 
argument repertoire score than 
non-partisan students prior to 
discussion.  
H4b: Partisan students will be 
significantly less likely to 
incorporate new information 
into their understanding of the 
issue following deliberation 
than non-partisan students. 
H4c: Partisan students will be 
less likely to recall information 
that supports an opposing side 
of the issue at the end of the 
term.  
H4a: Argument repertoire (pre-
deliberation); partisan and 
ideological self-placement. 
H4b: Argument repertoire (post-
deliberation); partisan and 
ideological self-placement. 
H4c: Argument repertoire (end 
of term); partisan and 
ideological self-placement.  
 
Research Question 4 
This question can be answered by correlating students’ argument repertoire scores 
with their partisanship, as well as through examination of student interviews. Argument 
repertoire scores reflect the difference in the number of arguments supporting and 
opposing a student’s position. These scores reflect biased assimilation of information 
both from research and deliberation.  
H4a tests students’ balance of information regarding the issue prior to 
deliberation. Linear regressions examined the relationship between partisanship and the 
argument repertoire score while controlling for demographic, educational, and other 
factors. Positive correlations between partisan strength and argument repertoire would 
indicate support for the hypothesis.  
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Tests for H4b are similar to those for H4a. The difference in each student’s 
argument repertoire scores can be calculated to indicate the degree of biased assimilation 
that occurred during the deliberation. Students who have incorporated more opposing 
information into their understanding of the issue should see a reduction in repertoire 
scores, making the difference between the second and first score negative. Those who 
reinforced their own arguments during the deliberation should see an increase in 
repertoire score, making the difference between pre- and post-deliberation scores 
positive. There is expected to be a correlation between strength of partisanship and 
change in argument repertoire score. A positive regression coefficient for partisan social 
identity in the regression models would indicate support for H4b. 
Again using argument repertoire as a measure at the end of the semester, I tested 
H4c to examine whether the impacts of deliberation endure two weeks following the 
exercise. Given the three time points involved, it may be appropriate to examine a within-
subjects, longitudinal model to capture changes over time. Each student would serve as 
the 2nd level of the model and each reassessment of argument repertoire would serve as 
the level 1 outcome. A fully unconditional model was constructed to assess the amount of 
variance at the student level to determine if such a model is appropriate. Again degrees of 
freedom are a concern, meaning that multi-level models may be too complex for analysis 
of this particular data set.  
Potential Issues or Limitations 
As with any study, there are potential issues to anticipate that may impact the 
results and conclusions drawn. These include a narrow demographic and geographic 
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scope, a heightened political atmosphere, limitations of the survey, and the chosen 
environment for deliberation.  
The participating schools in this study provide a substantial amount of political 
diversity. Yet, they do not have high levels of racial/ethnic diversity or socioeconomic 
diversity. There is the potential that drawing on rural communities from within a single 
state may impact the results. For example, participation in discussions about politics may 
be governed by different norms in different groups or different regions. Rural regions in 
particular, may be impacted by what Cramer (2016) refers to as “rural consciousness,” or 
a place-based interpretation of current events that involves a general perception of urban 
areas and public employees siphoning resources away from rural communities. 
Replications of this study should seek a larger, more diverse sample so as to correct both 
issues of statistical power and generalizability.  
It is likely that a study of partisanship in young people will be impacted by the 
active political climate surrounding the 2016 national elections. Being a presidential 
election year, it is typical to see increased media coverage of partisan differences and 
higher engagement in politics. These considerations might make students more aware of 
both their own and others’ political feelings. Heightened political awareness and partisan 
tensions during the election may inflate the number of students identifying with a 
political party, alter the tone of student deliberations, and increase student perceptions of 
differences between the two major political parties. In other words, differences in student 
behavior and outcomes detected by the study may be artifacts of the election context of 
the study and not evidence of true differences between partisan and non-partisans 
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students. While the salience of political issues in an election year must certainly be 
acknowledged, I do not feel this represents a weakness in the design. Discussion-based 
pedagogies are at their best when the issues under discussion are timely and relevant. 
Given the current state of political discourse in the country, there are likely issues that 
activate partisan identities regardless of whether there is an election or not. Further, it is 
hoped that the results of this study will shed light on the mechanics of discussion when 
students have meaningful social identities (partisan or otherwise) relevant to the 
discussion topic.  
Student political identities are likely more diverse than the measures used in this 
study can capture. While most partisans can be classified within the two-party system, I 
acknowledge that such a classification leaves out students who might identify with the 
Libertarian, Green, or other parties. Further, such students may find it difficult to place 
themselves on the ideological spectrum. For example, Libertarians, because they wish to 
minimalize government influence in all areas, tend to be conservative in economic 
matters but liberal in most social matters. Including a more diverse understanding of 
political identity is important for future research, though practical limitations prevent its 
inclusion on the surveys at this time. There are not sufficient numbers of these less-
common political identifications in the sample to conduct meaningful statistical analysis. 
If such students are present in the sample, student discussion posts and interviews may 
provide data on how these students perceive discussions of political issues.  
While the present study utilizes a diverse array of measures and techniques, it is 
important to remember that such instruments have been subject to criticism. For example, 
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authors such as Lupia (2016) have critiqued the civic knowledge scale used in this study 
as both a control and predictor variable. Though the scale tends to perform well on 
measures of validity, there are questions as to what inferences can be made from the 
questions included. Lupia argues that items about the basic structure of government do 
not adequately justify conclusions about an individual’s knowledge of civics or politics. 
The scale, though correlated with many political behaviors, may not be a truly random 
sample of all possible political knowledge and may privilege a particular set of values 
over others. When using such measures, they must be interpreted within the proper 
context with knowledge of their limitations.  
Lastly, the online deliberation used in the study may differ from face-to-face 
political contexts enough to limit the interpretation of the results. Online deliberation 
lacks many of the social cues found in face-to-face interactions. Not having some of these 
cues, which can serve to reinforce social status or silence other participants, tends to 
broaden participation in online deliberations (Ho & Mcleod, 2008). It should be noted, 
however, that these social cues may cause students to behave differently and produce 
different outcomes than the online deliberation proposed for this study.  
Conclusion 
In order to better understand the interaction between students’ partisanship and 
the complex environment of the classroom, a wealth of data is required. The present 
design utilizes multiple avenues, both quantitative and qualitative, to approach the issue 
of student partisanship. By investigating whether partisan students differ from their non-
partisan peers in terms of knowledge and self-efficacy, behavior during deliberation, 
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response to deliberation, and perceptions of the class as a whole, I hope to provide insight 
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CHAPTER 4 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PARTISAN AND NON-PARTISAN STUDENTS 
Chapter 3 described a study of how student partisanship impacts social studies 
education, focusing on an online discussion of a controversial political issue. Two rural, 
Midwestern schools, Loomis High School and Nichols High School, participated in the 
study. In addition to participating in the online discussion, all students completed three 
questionnaires about their experiences with politics, the discussion, and a number of other 
variables of interest. Further, 10 students participated in additional interviews. The results 
of that study, presented and discussed in the next two chapters, broadly support the 
argument that partisanship is influential in student behavior and also provide some 
indication that school experiences can alter the effects of partisanship on some student 
outcomes. This chapter will review data from the surveys and interviews to explore 
baseline differences in knowledge, dispositions and perceptions of the classroom between 
partisan and non-partisan students.  
Research Question 1 
 Research Question 1 (R1) seeks to establish whether partisan students are 
different from their non-partisan peers prior to beginning the deliberation exercise. In 
particular, I examine commonly-used measures in civic education, such as civic 
knowledge, political efficacy, and open classroom climate. Further, I extend the analysis 
to explore whether students’ perceptions of partisanship in the classroom impact their 
evaluations of the course or the teacher. The question and its associated hypotheses are 
summarized below:  
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R1:  Are partisan students different from their non-partisan peers in terms of 
political and civic knowledge, sense of political efficacy, and perceptions of the 
classroom environment (e.g., climate for discussion, perceptions of classmate and 
teacher opinion)? 
H1a: Students with partisan identities will have significantly higher 
political and civic knowledge than their non-partisan peers.  
H1b: Students with partisan identities will have significantly higher levels 
of political efficacy than their non-partisan peers.  
H1c: There will be a significant, inverse relationship between 
student/classmate partisan distance and perception of open classroom 
climate.   
H1d: There will be a significant, inverse relationship between 
student/teacher partisan distance and perception of open classroom 
climate. 
H1e: There will be a significant, inverse relationship between 
student/teacher partisan distance and positive course evaluations. 
Baseline Differences Between Partisans and Non-Partisans 
 H1a and H1b were tested using a multivariate regression analysis, controlling for 
demographic variables, reported classroom experiences (previous social studies pedagogy 
exposure, recalled classroom climate, school democratic climate), and levels of school 
and community involvement. The outcome variable for H1a is the number of 
civic/political knowledge questions answered correctly. For H2b, political efficacy was 
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split into internal and external political efficacy and each was analyzed separately. The 
key predictor in both analyses is a measure of partisan social identity. The results of both 
analyses are summarized in Table 4.1 and 4.2.   
Table 4.1 
 
Regression Predicting the Relationship between Partisanship and Civic Knowledge 
 Model 4.1.A (Partisan 
Social Identity) 
Model 4.1.B (Strong 
Partisanship) 
 β (SE) β (SE) 
Partisan Social Identity  0.04 (.03)  
Strong Partisan      0.71 (.33) * 
Social Studies Pedagogy  0.06 (.04)  0.04 (.04) 
Open Classroom Climate  0.00 (.04)  0.00 (.04) 
School Democratic 
Climate 
 0.04 (.05)  0.04 (.05) 
School Involvement  0.03 (.07)  0.05 (.07) 
Community Involvement  0.03 (.07)  0.03 (.07) 
Female    -0.72 (.34) *    -0.71 (.32) * 
White -0.23 (.55) -0.08 (.55) 
SES  0.25 (.21)  0.26 (.21) 
Constant   -0.47 (1.34)   -0.16 (1.25) 
Adjusted R2                  .06                   .08 
Note. * p < .05 
 
Contrary to studies with adults, there was no significant relationship between 
students’ strength of partisan identity and the number of correct answers on a scale of 
basic civic/political knowledge (β = .32, p = .11). A visual inspection of the partisan 
identity strength variable suggested that there might only be differences in civic 
knowledge among individuals at the high end of the partisan social identity scale. The 
model was rerun substituting the partisan social identity predictor with a binary “strong 
partisanship” variable created by assigning individuals who marked 1 or 7 on the 7-point 
partisan identity scale a 1 and all other respondents a 0. Using this new predictor, the 
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model shows significant differences between strong partisans (β = .71, p < .05) and other 
students in terms of civic knowledge, with the strong partisans tending to have higher 
scores. Despite this result being more in line with studies of adults, it should be noted that 
neither model is statistically significant as a whole. Thus, these analyses provide only 
weak support for H1a.  
Table 4.2 
 
Regression Predicting the Relationship between Political Efficacy 
 Model 4.2.A (Internal) Model 4.2.B (External) 
 β (SE) β (SE) 
Partisan Social Identity        0.46 (.11) ***     0.27 (.08) ** 
Social Studies Pedagogy 0.10 (.14)  0.08 (.11) 
Open Classroom Climate 0.12 (.13)  0.01 (.10)  
School Democratic 
Climate 
   0.34 (.17) *  0.09 (.13) 
School Involvement 0.21 (.22)  0.18 (.16)  
Community Involvement 0.05 (.23) -0.02 (.16)  
Female     -2.61 (1.06) * -0.55 (.78)  
White    0.45 (1.73)    0.85 (1.32) 
SES 0.82(.66)  0.51 (.48) 
Constant   -0.86 (4.21)    1.78 (3.06) 
Adjusted R2 .28***                  .13* 
Note. * p < .05, *** p < .001 
 
  Regarding H1b, the results indicate a correlation between partisan social 
identification and both internal and external political efficacy. The relationship between 
partisan social identity and internal political efficacy (β = 0.46, p < .001) is positive when 
controlling for demographics, school experiences, and involvement. Partisan social 
identity also exhibited a positive relationship with external political efficacy (β = 0.27, p 
< .01). It should also be noted, although not the focus of the present analysis, that there 
are several interesting relationships between the control variables and both political 
   77 
 
efficacy outcomes. Identifying as female was correlated with a substantial decrease in 
internal political efficacy (β = -2.61, p < .05). Increases in school democratic climate, on 
the other hand, were correlated with increases in internal efficacy (β = .34, p < .05).  
Partisan Distance and Perceptions of the Classroom Climate 
  H1c and H1d were tested using a single multivariate regression model (see Table 
4.3). In the model, students’ perceptions of open classroom climate served as the outcome 
variable. The focal predictors in the analysis were two measures of partisan distance, 
which reflect each student’s perceived difference between themselves and their 
classmates or teacher. The measures are created by subtracting the student’s self-
placement on a 7-point partisan scale from their perceived placement of their classmates 
or their teacher and taking the absolute value. Controls were added for demographics 
(gender, race, income) and student involvement in the school and community. In 
addition, as the use of good pedagogy is often tied to perceptions of classroom climate 
(Hahn, 1996), students’ recollections of pedagogies used in their social studies classes 
were included as a control. Several iterations of the model were run, dropping non-
significant predictors (gender, income, school involvement, and community involvement) 










Regression Predicting Student Perceptions of Open Classroom Climate 
 β SE 
Partisan Distance - 
Teacher 
-0.77      0.25 ** 
Partisan Distance - 
Classmates 
-0.09 0.27 
Social Studies Pedagogy   0.50        0.09 *** 
School Democratic 
Climate 
 0.19 0.12 
White  1.37 1.23 
Constant  9.73       2.33*** 
Adjusted R2   .38  
Note. **p <.01, ***p <.001 
 
The results of the analysis provide support for H1d but not H1c. Perceptions of 
classroom climate are inversely correlated with partisan distance from the teacher (β = -
.77, p > .01) but not partisan distance from the rest of the class (β = -.09, p = .73). In 
other words, students in this sample who perceived a greater distance between themselves 
and their teacher in terms of partisanship also tended to perceive the classroom climate as 
less open. Student recollection of good pedagogical experiences was correlated with 
higher perceptions of classroom climate (β = .50, p >.001), indicating that the impacts of 
partisan distance on perceptions of classroom climate are counteracted by exposure to 
good social studies pedagogies.  
Kelly-Woessner and Woessner (2008) found that actual partisan distance between 
students and teachers was not as impactful as students perceived distance. I used the 
teachers’ self-identifications of partisanship to calculate an actual partisan distance score 
using the same procedure described above. I then reran the model in Table 4.3 
substituting actual partisan distance for perceived partisan distance. Consistent with 
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Kelly-Woessner and Woessner’s results, actual partisan distance was not a significant 
predictor of perceptions of open classroom climate.  
 Student comments during the interviews also suggest that perception of teacher 
partisanship may be tied to elements of an open classroom climate. In particular, students 
seem to be inferring teacher partisanship from how differing perspectives are brought up 
in the classroom. For example, Hannah, a student at Loomis High School, and Naomi, a 
student at Nichols High School, both state the teachers’ choices of topics or materials hint 
at their political leanings.  
CC: And then, if you had to guess, would you say you’d be able to tell what the 
political beliefs of most of your teachers are? 
Hannah: Probably not. Especially this [election] year, it’s so chaotic. I feel like 
both of the candidates are just kind of crazy. 
CC: Okay, yeah.  
Hannah: Some of them…there’s probably a good 10 or so that I could probably 
pick out what they are going to do, but the rest of them not as much. I 
don’t think I could pinpoint anything.  
CC: Okay, so let’s take those 10 that you could pick out. Is Mrs. [Albertson] one 
of them? 
Hannah: Well, she’s been telling us a lot of stuff like she doesn’t even know what 
she’s going to do in the election, like when it comes time to vote, but I 
could probably like guess. I think.  
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CC: And so what are the kind of clues that you use to make that judgment or what 
would you base that guess on? 
Hannah: Just when we go through articles or stuff like that. Just the opinions that 
she brings forth… seem to support one party more than the other, and 
then, I don’t know. She always sticks to certain situations and always 
strongly supports certain people of history, and so looking back at the 
presidents that she enjoyed and that she always wants us to know 
information about. It just kind gets you an idea of it.  
Hannah, who identified as ideological moderate and political Independent, claimed she 
was able to figure out Mrs. Albertson’s political feelings because of a perceived 
imbalance of political perspectives. Her comments imply that she felt that there was a 
lack of voices from the “other side.” On the other hand, Naomi, a liberal democrat, seems 
to infer the teacher’s political beliefs by whether or not the teacher choose to address 
social issues at all. 
CC: When you talk about politics in courses, you kind of mentioned that you 
could sort of, you know, figure out the teacher. Could you say a little more 
about that? Like how are you able to tell what the teacher thinks, because, 
you know, they don’t officially say it, as you said… 
Naomi: Yeah, but you can, how they talk about things. Like if they are very cool 
with a lot of the social issues, especially in classes that talk about the 
issues in our world, and if they’re very…you can kind of tell they lean a 
little bit more liberal, to that side. And if they don’t want to talk about it, 
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or if you ask them about it, and they say nothing, you can kind of tell. 
Because a lot of people don’t like to be Trump supporters. If you ask 
them, and they’re embarrassed about it, they don’t say anything.  
 To Naomi, bringing up social issues in class is an indication of liberal political 
leanings. In her judgment, teachers who are silent on these issues, perhaps due to 
embarrassment, are implicitly conservative. There is a clear partisan dimension to her 
comments, as she assumes that individuals who support Trump hold socially 
unacceptable positions on social issues.  
 Such comments suggest that student perception of partisan distance is, in part, 
established through perceptions of open classroom climate. While partisan distance is 
correlated with perceptions of open climate, the relationship may be reciprocal, with 
levels of classroom climate forming the basis for the judgment of partisan distance, which 
then impact judgments of classroom climate.  
Partisan Distance and Teacher/Course Evaluations 
H1e predicts that higher partisan distance between students and their teacher will 
result in lower evaluations of the teacher and the course. A course evaluation form was 
split into two measures, with one set of items evaluating the teacher’s behaviors and the 
other set evaluating the course content. Each variable was used as the outcome of a 
regression analysis. Similar to previous analyses, demographic variables and school and 
community involvement were added as controls. In addition, two other scales (political 
efficacy and perceived polarization) were added to the model as controls for the purposes 
of ruling out alternative explanations. Students high in political efficacy, for example, 
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might not have felt they had much to learn from a government course, and therefore 
might be expected to give lower course ratings. Lastly, variables that would be expected 
to raise or lower course evaluations (open classroom climate, school democratic climate, 
and social studies pedagogy exposure) were added to the model as controls.  
 Contrary to Kelly-Woessner and Woessner (2008), who found that partisan 
distance predicted lower teacher and course evaluations by college students, students in 
this sample did not show any significant differences in teacher evaluations or course 
evaluations based on partisan distance between the teacher and classmates. These results 
do not support H1e. However, in Kelly-Woessner and Woessner’s study, it was also 
found that ideological perceptions of the teacher influenced student evaluations of the 
course. A revised model was constructed that included students’ perceived ideological 
distance from their teacher and classmates (constructed using the same methods as 
partisan distance). In order to preserve degrees of freedom and improve model fit, 
controls that did not show a significant relationship to the outcome variables (school and 
community involvement, school democratic climate, and social studies pedagogy) were 
dropped from the model. Further, each of the revised models was rerun to include 
theoretically reasonable interaction terms between partisan distances and predictor 
variables. Through this process, it was found that an interaction between ideological 
distance and the open classroom climate scale substantially improved model fit. Given 
that previous research suggests open classroom climate is associated with improved civic 
knowledge and participation (Torney-Purta, Lehmann, Oswald, & Schultz, 2001), it is 
reasonable to explore open classroom climate as a moderator of the relationship between 
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partisan or ideological distance and teacher and course evaluations. The revised models 
are summarized in Tables 4.4 and 4.5.  
Table 4.4  
 
Regression Predicting Teacher Evaluations 
 Model 4.4.A (Basic 
Model) 
Model 4.4.B (Interaction 
Model) 
 β (SD) β (SD) 
Partisan Distance - 
Teacher 
 0.33 (0.33)  0.33 (0.32) 
Partisan Distance - Class  0.62 (0.32)  0.60 (0.31) 
Ideological Distance - 
Teacher 
       -1.53 (0.40) ***        -4.31 (1.00) *** 
Ideological Distance - 
Class 
-0.07 (0.41) -0.03 (0.39) 
Open Classroom Climate     0.22 (0.10) *  0.00 (0.12) 
Perceived Polarization   -0.50 (0.22)*    -0.46 (0.21) * 
Political Efficacy - 
External 
       0.38 (0.12) **     0.30 (0.11) * 
Political Efficacy - 
Internal 
 -0.09 (0.07) -0.08 (0.07) 
Female  -0.72 (0.97) -0.82 (0.92) 
White        3.96 (1.42) **      3.44 (1.36) * 
SES1  -0.19 (0.51)   0.00 (0.49) 
Ideological Distance: 
OCC 
        0.15 (0.05) ** 
Intercept        26.85 (3.46) ***        31.83 (3.70) *** 
Adjusted R2 .40*** .45*** 
Note. *p < .05, **p <.01, *** p< .001 
 
In the revised models for teacher evaluations, partisan distance with the teacher (β 
= .33, p = .33) is still not significantly correlated with teacher evaluations, though 
ideological distance with the teacher is (β = -1.53, p < .001). The negative regression 
coefficient indicates that ideological distance has the inverse effect originally 
hypothesized for partisan distance. Increasing the distance between the student’s reported 
ideology and their perception of teacher’s ideology is correlated with a decline in scores 
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on student evaluations of the teacher. In this model, the open classroom climate scale has 
a significant positive relationship with teacher evaluations (β = .22, p < .05), indicating 
that more open classroom climates are correlated with higher scores on the teacher 
evaluations. When an interaction term testing open classroom climate as a moderator of 
the relationship between ideological distance and teacher evaluations is included in the 
model, it provides evidence that the relationship between ideological distance and teacher 
evaluations is contingent on the classroom climate (β = .15, p  <. 01). In particular, the 
effect of ideological distance on teacher evaluations is far less when the student perceives 
a very open classroom climate than when the classroom climate is perceived as closed 
(see Figure 4.1).   
 
 
Figure 8.1. Relationship between ideological distance from the teacher and 
teacher evaluation score at differing levels of perceived open classroom climate. 
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Table 4.5  
 
Regression Predicting Course Evaluations 
 Model 4.5.A (Basic 
Model) 
Model 4.5.B (Interaction 
Model) 
 β (SD) β (SD) 
Partisan Distance - 
Teacher 
     0.70 (0.24) **       0.71 (0.24) ** 
Partisan Distance - Class  0.27 (0.25)  0.25 (0.24) 
Ideological Distance - 
Teacher 
   -0.75 (0.29) *      -2.44 (0.78) ** 
Ideological Distance - 
Class 
-0.58 (0.31) -0.56 (0.30) 
Open Classroom Climate         0.31 (0.08) ***  0.18 (0.09) 
Perceived Polarization -0.06 (0.17) -0.04 (0.16) 
Political Efficacy - 
External 
    0.23 (0.09) *     0.19 (0.09) * 
Political Efficacy - 
Internal 
    0.12 (0.06) *     0.12 (0.06) * 
Female  0.15 (0.73)  0.08 (0.72) 
White         3.74 (1.09) ***       3.44 (1.06) ** 
SES1 -0.07 (0.39)  0.03 (0.38) 
Ideological Distance: 
OCC 
     0.09 (0.04) * 
Intercept   3.79 (2.64)     6.83 (2.89) * 
R2 .42*** .45*** 
Note. *p < .05, **p <.01, *** p< .001 
 
When predicting course evaluations using the revised model, the addition of 
ideological distance improves model fit. The model illustrates course evaluations are 
significantly correlated with both partisan distance from the teacher (β = .70, p < .01) and 
ideological distance from the teacher (β = -.75, p < .05). Interestingly, partisan distance 
has the opposite of the hypothesized effect, with increases in partisan distance between 
the teacher and a student being correlated with a higher course evaluation. Ideological 
distance, on the other hand, has the expected inverse correlation with course evaluations. 
Again, a more open classroom climate is associated with a significant increase in course 
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evaluations (β = .31, p < .001). Adding an interaction term between ideological distance 
and classroom climate to the course evaluation model suggests that open classroom 
climate serves as a moderator of ideological distance when predicting course evaluations 
(β = .09, p < .05). When the classroom climate is perceived as highly open, the impact of 
ideological distance on course evaluations is negated (see Figure 4.2). Although H1e was 
not initially supported, the revised models provide a clearer picture of the role of 
partisanship and ideology in how high school students view their teachers and courses.  
 
 
Figure 4.2. Relationship between ideological distance from the teacher and 
course evaluations at differing levels of perceived open classroom climate. 
 
As with the models predicting perceptions of open classroom climate, the models 
in Tables 4.4 and 4.5 were recalculated using actual partisan and ideological distance in 
place of perceived partisan and ideological distance. In both cases, actual ideological 
distance from the teacher was a significant predictor, though both models explained 
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substantially less variance than the reported interaction models (R2 = .32 for teacher 
evaluations, R2 = .41 for course evaluations).  
Summary of Results 
R1 sought to establish baseline differences between partisan and non-partisan 
students. H1a, regarding civic knowledge, and H1b, regarding political efficacy, sought 
to replicate differences found between adult partisans and non-partisans (e.g. 
Levendusky, 2009). The results from this sample indicate that these differences exist in 
the high school students measured, though the relationship between partisanship and 
political knowledge is only visible between those who identify as strong partisans and 
those who do not. Partisans also tend to score higher on measures of internal and external 
political efficacy. In general, this sample of high school students supports the notion that 
younger partisans are similar to adult partisans in terms of their civic knowledge and 
political efficacy.  
 H1c-e tested whether students’ perceptions of open classroom climate and ratings 
of the course and teacher are impacted by their perceptions of the partisanship of their 
fellow students and the teacher. Analyses found no support for H1c, that partisan distance 
between a student and his or her classmates impacted perceptions of open classroom 
climate. H1d, measuring the effects of partisan distance from the teacher, was supported. 
Partisan distance from the teacher significantly reduced perceptions of open classroom 
climate in this sample of high school students. While H1e, about the impacts of partisan 
distance on teacher and course evaluations was initially not supported, a more in-depth 
analysis revealed that perceived ideological distance between the student and teacher 
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were correlated with reductions in both teacher and course evaluations. Further, the 
revised models for H1e indicated that a highly open classroom climate moderates the 
negative relationship between ideological distance and these evaluations.  
 Overall, the investigation into R1 suggests that students’ partisanship and 
ideology are the source of significant differences in the classroom. The implications of 
these differences will be discussed below. 
Discussion of R1: Differences Between Partisan and Non-Partisan Students 
The analysis of R1 established that there are differences between partisan and 
non-partisan students. Some of these differences, like civic knowledge and political 
efficacy, are correlated with students’ partisan identification (or, in the case of civic 
knowledge, strong partisan identification). Other differences, such perception of open 
classroom climate or teacher/course evaluations, are more tied to students’ partisan 
identity relative to their perception of the teacher’s partisan identity (partisan distance). 
Greater differences in partisan identification predict lower perceptions of classroom 
climate and lower teacher/course evaluations. These differences are similar to those 
found in college students and adults (Kelly-Woessner & Woessner, 2008; Levendusky, 
2009), though the present study represents one of the few efforts to measures these 
effects in high school students.  
Civic Knowledge and Political Efficacy 
Higher civic knowledge and political efficacy are both desirable outcomes. Yet, 
as the analyses of these students’ responses are correlational, it would not be appropriate 
to conclude that students’ partisanship is causing the increases in political efficacy or 
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knowledge. It is possible that students’ partisan identities may motivate them to seek out 
information and engage in actions that support their chosen political group. It is also 
possible that students who have higher knowledge and a greater sense of efficacy have 
sufficient information to choose a political party they feel will best advance their stances 
on important issues. Although social identity theory (Iyengar et al., 2012; Tajfel, 1970) 
and research on how adult voters’ opinions follow those of their political party (Lenz, 
2012) suggest that students’ partisan identities are more likely to drive behavior, the data 
from this study does not rule out the opposite interpretation.  
Hess and McAvoy (2014) argued that, due to boons of civic knowledge, efficacy, 
and other outcomes associated with political partisanship, social studies educators should 
at least consider helping students develop partisan identities. To be clear, teachers would 
not point students towards a specific political party, but rather help them to see how their 
beliefs and values aligned with political parties. Such an approach, while not necessarily 
ruled out by this study, is likely a misinterpretation of the data on partisanship. The 
approach relies on the assumption that partisanship is a completely rational choice and 
ignores that many students may already have developed such identities prior to attending 
school (perhaps from the influence of family or community). The Hess and McAvoy 
proposal also takes a narrow view of the impacts of salient partisan identities in the 
classroom. As the results of this study reveal, partisanship is correlated with a number of 
student opinions and behaviors that need to be better understood before accepting such a 
recommendation.  
The Impact of Partisan Distance 
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Partisan distance was inversely correlated with perceptions of open classroom 
climate. In other words, a student who perceives their teacher as belonging to the same 
political party as them will tend to rate the classroom climate as higher than a student 
who believes that the teacher belongs to the other major political party. In line with 
previous research (Hess, 2009; James, 2009; Journell, 2011) students in this sample 
inferred their teachers’ partisanship through their choice of topics or the way they talked 
about those topics. No student interviewed for this study could recall either Ms. 
Albertson or Mr. Humphries directly mentioning their partisanship, though most had an 
impression of what their political beliefs were.  
 These results indicate an interesting dynamic in teacher political leanings. 
Regardless of whether teachers directly disclose their partisanship or, in the case of the 
teachers in this study, opt for neutral impartiality (Kelly, 1986), students will guess at 
their partisanship (Hess, 2009; Hess & McAvoy, 2015). Subsequently, those teachers will 
be “punished” or “rewarded” based on the students’ own partisan leanings when it comes 
to perceptions of open classroom climate. Such a dynamic is potentially consequential. 
Perception of open classroom climate is tied to student achievement in civics as well as 
other civic outcomes, such as intended voting (Campbell, 2008; Niemi & Junn, 1998; 
Quintellier & Hooghe, 2013; Torney-Purta et al., 2001). Students who perceive 
themselves as politically different from their teachers may not receive the same quality 
civic education as those who perceive political similarities with the teacher.  
 The “punishments” or “rewards” based on perceived political differences with the 
teacher are also visible on teaching and course evaluations, though in this case they are 
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more responsive to perceived ideological distance than perceived partisan distance. 
Students perceiving greater ideological distances between themselves and the teacher 
tend to give lower evaluations to the teacher and the course. These results are similar to 
Kelly-Woessner and Woessner’s (2008) study of partisan distance between college 
students and their professors. The current study goes beyond previous work in that it 
examines potential moderators of that relationship. In the two schools studied, 
evaluations of both the teacher and the course are moderated by perception of open 
classroom climate. Having a highly open classroom climate weakens the relationship 
between partisan distance and course evaluations. Perceiving the classroom climate as 
closed, however, tends to strengthen the negative relationship between the two. Because 
earlier results illustrated a correlation between partisan distance and perceptions of open 
classroom climate, it may be difficult for teachers to create the perception of openness 
among politically disagreeing students. If they are able to succeed, however, they are able 
to mitigate and, in the case of course evaluations, avoid the “penalties” of ideological 
distance on their evaluations.  
 Future research should investigate circumstances in which teachers can maintain 
perceptions of an open classroom climate regardless of ideological differences with their 
students. In the present study, both teachers adopted a stance of neutral impartiality 
(Kelly, 1986). Scholars such as Hess (2009), James (2010), and Journell (2011), however, 
recommend a stance of committed impartiality (Kelley, 1986) where teachers disclose 
their views along with holding a public commitment to making all viewpoints welcome 
in the classroom. Future research should investigate whether such a stance would be 
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better suited to fostering perceptions of open classroom climate, thereby countering the 
relationship between political difference and student evaluations.  
 While it is common advice that teachers should get to know their students, such 
advice has usually not been extended to politics. Many teachers will incidentally learn 
things about student political opinions through the normal course of teaching, but it is 
unlikely that partisanship is treated as a meaningful social identity in most classrooms. 
The results of R1, however, make the case that partisanship is not just meaningful to the 
individual student, but that it is connected to significant differences in knowledge and 
efficacy. Further, it substantially impacts the ways in which students perceive the 
classroom, with potential consequences for student learning and teachers’ evaluations. 
Future investigations should examine the ways teachers foster open classroom climates 
with the goal of making all students feel welcome in the class regardless of political 
differences.  
 This chapter has summarized and discussed the results of investigations in the R1, 
whether there are differences between partisan and non-partisan students prior to 
discussion. The next chapter will explore differences between partisan and non-partisan 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE IMPACTS OF PARTISANSHIP DURING AND AFTER AN ONLINE 
DISCUSSION 
 The previous chapter described differences between partisan and non-partisan 
students prior to discussing a controversial issue online (R1). This chapter reviews and 
discusses R2-R4. Using data collected from the study conducted in two rural, Midwestern 
high schools, Loomis and Nichols, I will explore partisan differences in student 
participation in the online discussion, changes following that discussion, and ability to 
recall points for and against a given position.  
Research Question 2 
Research question 2 (R2) explores differences in the behaviors of partisans in the 
context of an online discussion of a controversial issue. The question and associated 
hypotheses are listed below:   
R2:  Do partisan students behave differently than their non-partisan peers in the 
context of small group deliberations? Does the composition of deliberative groups 
(uniformly partisan or mixed) moderate these behaviors? 
H2: There will be an interaction between students’ strength of partisanship 
and their group condition (uniform or mixed) when predicting discussion 
behaviors.  
Recall that students were divided into groups of three or four, depending on class 
size and number of students who reported having a partisan identity. Each group’s 
discussion was broken down into statements and each statement was coded using the 
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scheme established by Stromer-Galley (2007). First, statements were sorted into four 
broad categories: problem talk (discussion of issue), meta-talk (summary of the 
discussion), process talk (discussing the assignment or the forum), or social talk (non-
problem talk directed at group members). Each statement was then broken down into 
subparts depending on its specific features. Depending on the complexity of the 
statement, each statement could have multiple subparts. The subparts were then grouped 
into clusters of behaviors for statistical analysis. For example, problem talk (by far the 
most frequently occurring type of statement) was broken down into five subtypes: 
Opinions, supporting facts, argumentation, agreements/disagreements, and questions. 
Opinions included any statements where a student expressed a position on the subject of 
the discussion. All statements that referenced specific statistics or sources were coded as 
supporting facts. Argumentation included all statements that were used to further a 
position but were not specifically connected to a fact (such as hypothetical examples or 
unsupported statements not classifiable as opinions). Agreements or disagreements were 
coded when students directly stated their position on a statement made by another 
discussion participant. All inquiries directed to the group or individual participants 
(excepting ones that were clearly rhetorical) were coded as questions. Tables 5.1 and 5.2 




Tally of Discussion Behavior Categories 
Problem Talk Meta-Talk Process Talk Social Talk 
740 2 4 39 
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 As Table 5.1 illustrates, problem talk dominated the discussions. Among the 
various types of problem talk (Table 5.2), opinions and argumentation were the most 
frequent type. Interestingly, students justified their positions more with argumentation 
than with factual support. During the interviews, two students commented on the lack of 
specific factual support included in the discussions. For example, Naomi suspected that 
members of her group had not done the preparatory work prior to the discussion.  
CC: How much do you think the opinions other people expressed were backed up 
by information or evidence? 
Naomi: I know some people just said what they knew would pass as an answer 
[laughs]….Probably about half the students actually researched, I would 
say. 
Similarly, Emma, a student at Loomis, expressed frustration at a relative lack of evidence 
from her discussion group.  
CC: So during this discussion, you mentioned that they seemed to be trying to 
convince you. How did your opinion change, if at all, as a result of the 
discussion?  
Emma: I don’t think it really did change so much, because – I don’t know – I like 
evidence to support claims and they didn’t really have substantial evidence 
to say why they believe their things, but I supported mine like with a 
bunch of evidence.  
CC: Okay, and so you felt that their points – they didn’t provide a lot of specific 
evidence. Was it mostly – What did they provide? 
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Emma: They just said [stop and frisk] decreased the crime rate and I wanted to 
know how much did it decrease by, if it did? All the evidence that I had 
found said that it didn’t decrease crime rate. It just stayed about the same.  
Table 5.2 
 
Tally of Discussion Behavior Sub-types 
Problem Talk   
Opinions    348 
Argumentation    337 
Facts  81 
Agreements/Disagreements    116 
Questions  33 
Meta-Talk  
Summary 2 
Process Talk  
Mistaken Post 1 
Technical Issue 2 
Discussion procedure 1 
Social Talk  






Note. As a single discussion behavior can contain multiple sub-behaviors, the totals 
from this table will not necessarily match those in Table 5.1. 
 
 Other interview participants felt as though they lacked information about the 
discussion topic. Samantha, a student a Nichols High, discussed how she felt the lack of 
information shaped her discussion.  
CC: Tell me how you felt discussing in the online environment when you were 
discussing taxes.  
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Samantha: I kind of liked it, enjoyed it because of my partner, the person I was 
arguing with in my group was opposed to [my position], so we had a good 
argument. I felt like arguing about the [tax] debate. 
CC: Okay, so tell me a little bit about that debate. Do you feel like you learned a 
lot from that person, or do you feel like they were all arguments you’d 
heard before? Tell me a little bit more about that.  
Samantha: They were arguments that I’ve heard before. Maybe – I don’t know if 
she really understood what was going on. I didn’t understand what was 
going on, so I feel like we were pretty even there.  
CC: Okay. When you say, “understand what was going on,” do you mean about 
taxes or what do you mean? 
Samantha: Sorry, I mean about taxes. We didn’t know any details or facts. We 
just knew the basics of what we learned in government [class].  
Samantha felt as though her knowledge about the issue was confined to what she had 
studied in government class. Because she and her partner lacked any knowledge outside 
of the course summaries, the discussion, while an enjoyable argument, lacked depth.  
 While there were not enough meta-, process, or social talk behaviors to conduct 
statistical analyses, it is possible to analyze the impacts of student partisanship on the 
frequency of problem talk, both in the aggregate and for each statement sub-type. 
Multivariate regression models were used to predict the number of problem talk 
behaviors based on the strength of student partisan identity. Controls were added to each 
model for demographics, group condition, political efficacy, perceived polarization, civic 
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knowledge, high quality social studies pedagogy exposure, and perception of open 
classroom climate. Because students are nested in groups, a multi-level model was 
considered to better account for variance between the groups. While an interclass 
correlation coefficient indicated that approximately 31% of the variance was between 
groups, there were not enough cases at the individual level to satisfactorily draw 
conclusions from the multi-level model results. In order to better reflect between-group 
differences, an additional control variable was added to each model containing the total 
number of each measured behavior in each group. Lastly, as H2 predicts that group 
condition (uniform or mixed) will impact the behavior of partisans during a discussion, 
all models were rerun with an interaction term between group condition and partisan 
identity strength.  
 The results of the analyses (see Table 5.3), while indicating that partisanship 
impacts student behaviors during a discussion, do not support H2. In all the analyses, the 
interaction term between partisan identity strength and group condition was non-
significant and was dropped from the model. Partisan identity strength was positively 
correlated with the total number of process talk statements (β = .15, p < .05), as well as 
the amount of argumentation contained in the process talk statements (β = .11, p < .01). 
Partisan social identity was not significantly correlated with expressing opinions, using 





















































































































































































































Adj. R2 .54 *** .54 *** .57 *** .38 *** .29 *** .24 *** 
Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
R2 Results Summary 
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Overall, there is evidence that partisanship impacts the behavior of students 
during a discussion, though that impact seems to be confined to their tendency to use 
argumentation (as opposed to factual support) during a discussion. Further, there is no 
evidence in this sample to support the notion that group condition moderated discussion 
behavior.  
Discussion of R2: Student Behavior During an Online Discussion 
Of the four main types of behavior coded during the online discussion, students in 
the sample engaged in far more “problem talk,” or discussion of the specific discussion 
prompt, than any other type of talk. This finding is probably in line with many teachers’ 
goals and expectations for online discussion. A productive discussion should focus on 
addressing the problem at hand. Less encouraging is the relative imbalance of problem 
talk-subtypes. Students in the discussion were far more likely to state their opinions or 
offer generalized arguments than they were to support either with specific factual 
information. During the online discussion, the ratios of opinion to fact and argumentation 
to fact were both approximately three to one.  
It is possible that the design of the online forum may have served to encourage 
problem talk over other types of contributions. For example, students in this exercise 
were not explicitly instructed to explore many possible solutions or attempt to reach a 
consensus. Both of these changes might have encouraged students to engage more in 
meta-talk, as it would likely require more summarizing and highlighting of disagreement 
to keep track of progress towards consensus. While the instructions (see Appendix B) 
require students to create at least one original post and respond to at least one of their 
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classmates’ posts, there were no word limits or requirements for using factual 
information. Without explicit requirements, student may have defaulted to sharing their 
opinions and use of argumentation, both of which are likely less cognitively demanding 
than providing specific factual support. Future studies should employ a variety of forum 
instructions to explore the impact of different requirements in deliberative environment.  
 In this sample, partisan social identity was positively correlated with the number 
of problem talk statements produced. In other words, the more a student identified with 
their chosen political party, the more problem talk statements they tended to produce. In 
particular, partisans seemed to favor argumentation statements (such as hypothetical 
examples or statements phrased as facts but not backed up with any citation). Because 
each individual statement could have multiple sub-statements, it may be that the 
significant effect for partisanship is not primarily driven by the difference in 
argumentation. It is likely, however, that argumentative statements contributed a 
substantial amount to that significant effect.  
 Given that partisans tend to have higher civic knowledge, one might expect that 
partisans would be able to provide more, albeit skewed, factual statements in their posts. 
Considering the discussions as a whole were low on factual information it may be that the 
students in general were unmotivated or unable to provide specific factual support for 
their arguments. Partisans may have simply had the advantage of having more arguments 
at their disposal, which they then used in place of facts. There are certainly many models 
of political discussions in the media that are mere exchanges of talking points. It is also 
possible that students, especially partisans, do not make a distinction between providing 
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factual support and arguing through talking points, although evidence from the interviews 
indicates that some students recognized that many arguments in their discussion were not 
accompanied by concrete information. There may also be an unwillingness to call out 
other students on unsupported statements, inapt metaphors, or other such statements. A 
norm of politeness may permeate the discussion, allowing argumentation to dominate the 
discussion even when participants notice that such statements are unsupported.  
 The results of this study once again illustrate the potential impact of partisanship 
in the high school classroom. Partisans tend to make more, though not necessarily better-
informed, statements. While teachers should encourage students in general to substantiate 
their statements in a discussion forum, it may be wise to pay particular attention to 
partisan students.  
Research Question 3 
The third research questions seeks to better understand how partisan and non-
partisan students are impacted by an online discussion exercise and whether these 
impacts are contingent on the discussion group context. The question and hypotheses are 
listed below: 
R3: Are partisan and non-partisan students impacted differently by deliberation? 
Specifically, are changes in sense of political efficacy, opinions about political 
groups (e.g., Democrats, Republicans), or issue opinions different between 
partisans and non-partisans? Does deliberative group composition moderate these 
changes?  
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H3a: Students’ political efficacy should increase following the 
deliberative exercise, regardless of partisanship.  
H3b: Partisan students will become more extreme in their opinions 
following deliberation, as compared to non-partisan students.  
H3c: Partisan students will become more affectively polarized following 
deliberation, as compared to non-partisan students.  
H3d: Deliberation condition (mixed vs. uniform) will moderate the 
changes described in H3b and H3c. 
Impacts of Discussion on Students’ Political Efficacy 
Frequency of discussion is often associated with increases in political efficacy. 
H3a inquires as to whether these changes occur immediately following a deliberation and 
persist for at least two weeks. As with previous analyses, political efficacy is divided into 
internal and external efficacy. Paired t-tests were used to compare the measures of 
political efficacy prior to discussion with those after the discussion. A second t-test was 
used to compare the political efficacy levels after the discussion with those students 
reported approximately two weeks later. A final t-test compared overall change from Q1 
to Q3. The results of the t-tests are summarized in Table 5.4. 
 Following the discussion students showed increases in both internal (t = 10.44, p 
< .001) and external (t = 3.40, p < .001) political efficacy. After the two weeks, however, 
internal efficacy returned to pre-discussion levels (t = -10.95, p < .001). External political 
efficacy, while showing a comparatively smaller effect, did not decrease two weeks 
following the discussion (t  = .25, p = .80).  




Pairwise T-Tests of Changes in Political Efficacy at Q1, Q2, and Q3 





Internal Efficacy 4.28 *** -  4.02 ***         0.15  
External Efficacy 0.96 ***            0.08 0.94 *** 
Note: *** p < .0 
1. Due missing cases, differences from Q1/Q3 may not equal the differences in 
differences between Q1/Q2 and Q2/Q3 
 
 To delve more deeply into these associations, regression analyses were conducted 
to control for demographic factors, group condition, and partisanship. To control for 
differing quality of the discussions, further controls were added to the regression models 
to control for the amount of problem talk in each discussion, both at the individual and 
group level. None of the demographic factors, group condition (uniform or mixed), 
partisan social identity, or group behavior variables were significant predictors of 
changes external political efficacy either from Q1 to Q2 or Q2 to Q3.  These results 
suggest that the change in external political efficacy was evenly spread across the 
students in the sample and provide partial support for H3a.  
 Changes in internal political efficacy from Q1 to Q2 (see Table 5.5) were 
positively correlated to both students’ levels of partisan social identity and SES. Increases 
in partisan social identity were predictive of increases in internal political efficacy (β = 
.23, p < .05), as were increases in SES status (β = 1.19, p < .05). These same predictors 
were not predictive of the decreases in political efficacy from Q2 to Q3. Because the 
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changes were undone two weeks following the discussion, H3a is not supported 
regarding internal efficacy.  
Table 5.5 
 
Regression Predicting Changes in Internal Political Efficacy from Q1 to Q2 
 β SE 
Partisan Social Identity  0.23    0.09 * 
Mixed Group -0.11 0.91 
Process Talk: Individual  0.10 0.18 
Process Talk: Group -0.06 0.07 
Female -1.30 0.92 
White -2.85 1.51 
SES  1.19    0.55 * 
Constant  1.20 2.64 
Adjusted R2 .10  
Note. *p <.05 
 
Impact of Discussion on Students’ Issue Opinion 
Following the discussion, I wanted to see if there was evidence of differing 
attitude changes between partisans and non-partisans. Literature on motivated reasoning 
(Kunda, 1990; Lodge & Tabor, 2013) and opinion polarization (Sunstein, 2002) suggests 
discussing issues in like-minded groups tends to result in opinions being reinforced and 
becoming more extreme. Following the discussion, students indicated whether their 
opinion became weaker, remained the same, or stronger (Wojcieszak & Price, 2010). The 
measure uses a 1-9 scale, with lower values representing moving away from one’s 
previous opinion and higher values indicating a strengthening of opinion. Marking a 5 
indicates that a student’s opinion did not change during the discussion. For the purposes 
of analysis, 5 was subtracted from every value to create a scale where positive values 
represented a strengthening of opinion, negative values represented weakening of opinion 
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and 0 represented no change. Most students in this sample either experienced no change 
in their opinion or a strengthening. The average score on the revised scale was .63.  
Table 5.6 
 
Regression Predicting Opinion Change 
 Model 4.10.A Model 4.10.B 
 β (SE) β (SE) 
Partisan Social Identity     0.07 (.03) *   0.02 (.03) 
Mixed Group  0.43 (.32)   0.36 (.29) 
Amount of Disagreement -0.05 (.05)  -0.08 (.05) 
Female -0.61 (.34)  -0.38 (.32) 
White  0.35 (.56)   0.22 (.52) 
SES  0.32 (.20)   0.26 (.19) 
Political Efficacy - 
External 
 - 0.10 (.08) 
Civic Knowledge      -0.65 (.28) * 
Pol. Eff.: Civ. Knowledge         0.07 (.02) ** 
Constant -1.39 (.95)     0.21 (1.17)  
Adjusted R2                     .09 *   .27 *** 
Note. * p < .05, ** p <. 01, *** p < .001 
 
Regression analysis was used to predict perceived opinion change (Table 5.5) 
based on partisan social identity, demographic factors, group condition, and amount of 
disagreement in the discussion as predictor variables. Of these variables, only partisan 
social identity significantly predicted a perceived strengthening of opinion (β = .07, p < 
.05). A second model with an added interaction between group condition and partisan 
social identity did not explain any additional variance or improve model fit. A third 
iteration of the model (Table 5.6) added other reasonable predictors such as civic 
knowledge, internal and external political efficacy, perceived polarization, interest in 
diverse perspectives, and the amount of problem talk in the group as further predictors. 
Of these predictors, only civic knowledge and external political efficacy improved model 
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fit. Further, an interaction between civic knowledge and external efficacy was significant, 
suggesting that the impact of political efficacy on opinion change may be different 
depending on the student’s sense of civic knowledge (β = .07, p < .01). In particular, the 
slope of the line predicting opinion change as a function of political efficacy is far greater 
when the student has a high level of civic knowledge (see Figure 5.1). At low levels of 
civic knowledge, the slope of the same line is flat. The addition of these terms made 
partisan social identity a non-significant predictor. These results suggest that 
strengthening of opinion in this sample is more a function of the civic knowledge and 
external political efficacy associated with partisanship rather than partisan identity itself. 
Thus, there is only limited quantitative support for H3b.  
 
Figure 5.1. Interaction between external political efficacy and civic knowledge 
when predicting students’ perceived opinion change.  
 
 Nine of the ten students interviewed discussed how their opinion was impacted by 
the discussion. Of these, there was also no consistent pattern of opinion change evident 
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across partisanship or group condition. Three students, Hannah (moderate Independent), 
Heather (conservative Republican), and Samantha (liberal Democrat) all claimed that the 
discussion moderated their opinion strength and exposed them to new ideas. Despite both 
Hannah and Samantha being in the uniform group condition, they reported that 
disagreements with their group members were an important factor causing them to 
partially change their opinion.  
CC: You mentioned you’d come to consensus. Did your own opinion change at 
all on the issue?  
Samantha: I think maybe I was a little radical in the beginning and then I sort of 
calmed down and think we both really compromised and then agreed with 
it.  
CC: Let’s say you were to go to the ballot box and vote and the issues of taxation 
were on there. Would you vote any differently than you would have at the 
beginning of the discussion? In other words, is your original opinion still 
what you would do in the real world? 
Samantha: Yeah, it’s different.  
Another three students, Tim (conservative Republican), Theo (conservative 
Republican), Riley (liberal Democrat), and Peter (liberal Democrat) reported that their 
opinion stayed approximately the same throughout the discussion. Riley, who discussed 
in a uniform group, reported that her group members largely agreed from the start of the 
discussion and that there was not much new information in the discussion. Both Tim and 
Peter, who were in mixed groups, reported that their group members expressed differing 
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opinions, though both noted that there was not much engagement with that difference. 
Rather, as Peter puts it, “they just said their opinion and then that’s pretty much it. They 
don’t explain much more than that.” Theo, also in a mixed group, perceived his group 
discussion as lively, though it ultimately did not cause him to change his opinion. 
Interestingly, he credited his contributions as causing a small opinion change from one of 
his group members.  
CC: You mentioned that there was some disagreement between one other person 
and yourself. How did you handle that disagreement?  
Theo: I think it was good. It gave me a chance to kind of try to persuade them as 
best as I could. It wasn’t disrespectful or anything, but just to get them to 
see things from my point of view. And she also tried to get me to see 
things from her point of view, so it feels good that way.  
CC: And would you say that that was successful? Were your opinions changed or 
do you feel their opinions changed? 
Theo: I feel like hers was maybe softened a little bit. She didn’t completely 
change sides with the argument, but I think both of us kind of got a chance 
to look at the other point of view, and I think hers was probably more 
softened than mine was.  
Emma (moderate Independent) and Naomi (liberal Democrat) both said their 
opinions got stronger as a result of the discussion. Emma, who had earlier mentioned she 
felt the most prepared of her group, cited her perception that she had the better-supported 
arguments as the reason she strengthened her opinion:  
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CC: Do you believe your opinion just as strongly as you did before? 
Emma: I would say it got stronger, because looking at my response compared to 
theirs. Like I said, I just had a bunch of evidence to support mine and none 
of them have evidence to support their claims, and it just kind of showed 
me that there wasn’t anything counter to what I was trying to say.  
Similarly, Naomi noted her opinion became stronger. In her interview, she also talked 
about the imbalance of information between her and her group mates and had expressed a 
disappointment that her group did not disagree with her more on the issue. Since 
everybody in her group agreed on the issue she felt her knowledge was strengthened: 
CC: So, going back to the discussion you had on taxes, how would you 
characterize your before and after opinion?  
Naomi: It think it became stronger, because of my group. Because we all agreed, 
there wasn’t anyone fighting [my opinion]. And I got to see how other 
people view it, so it just added more of my opinion on it.  
Emma and Naomi’s comments support the identified quantitative relationship between 
civic knowledge and opinion change. Being both high in political efficacy and having a 
lot of information at their disposal, their opinion got stronger as predicted by Model 
5.7.B.  
Impact of Discussion on Students’ Affective Polarization 
Political scientists and psychologists often cite affective polarization, or the gap 
between feelings about one’s own party and opposing parties, as an explanation for 
partisan rancor (Iyengar, Sood, & Lelkes, 2012; Iyengar & Westwood, 2015). H3c tests 
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the degree to which students’ affective polarization changes in response to the online 
discussion.  
Table 5.7  
 
Regression Predicting Students’ Affective Polarization Score 
 Model 5.7.A (Basic 
Model) 
Model 5.7.B (Interaction 
Model) 
 β (SD) β (SD) 
Partisan Social Identity         1.96 (.49) ***    3.19 (1.96) 
Strength of Partisanship        10.08 (3.04) **         9.50 (2.98) ** 
Strength of Ideology            9.34 (2.32) ***           9.61 (2.30) *** 
Social Studies Pedagogy        1.66 (.50) **   -1.61 (1.66) 
Open Classroom 
Climate 
-0.62 (.48)       3.34 (1.67) * 
School Democratic 
Climate 
-0.44 (.65)   -0.55 (0.63) 
Peer Discussions of 
Politics 
  -2.94 (1.93)   -2.75 (1.88) 
Parental Discussion of 
Politics 
   2.81 (1.80)    3.17 (1.80) 
External Pol. Efficacy -0.35 (.52)   -0.33 (0.52) 
Internal Pol. Efficacy        -1.05 (0.38) **      -1.01 (.37) ** 
Civic Knowledge       2.79 (1.21) *    2.12 (1.21) 
Classmate’s Partisan 
Distance 
      3.67 (1.44) *         3.92 (1.40) ** 
Partisan Soc. ID:OCC       -0.25 (0.10) * 
Partisan Soc. ID:SS 
Pedagogy 
       0.21 (0.10) * 
Adjusted R2 .72*** .74*** 
Note. *p < .05, **p <.01, *** p< .001 
 
 Prior to testing the change in affective polarization, it was necessary to illustrate 
that high school partisanship was tied to levels of affective polarization in young people. 
Table 5.7 illustrates the results of two regression analyses predicting students’ initial 
levels of polarization. Two items are of note: first, partisan social identity (β = 1.96, p < 
.001) and partisan identity strength (β = 10.08, p < .01) are both correlated with increases 
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in affective polarization and, second, there are two significant, opposing interaction terms 
in the model. The interactions between partisan social identity and both open classroom 
climate (β = -.25, p < .05) and social studies pedagogy exposure (β = .21, p < .05) 
indicate that these two elements may have differing effects on partisan students’ feelings 
toward others (see Figures 5.2 and 5.3). Namely, the relationship between partisan 
identity strength and affective polarization is much weaker in students who report a 
highly open classroom, but also much stronger in students who have historically been 
exposed to good social studies pedagogies. These results suggest that partisan affective 
polarization, though affected by the classroom environment and pedagogy, is present in 





Figure 5.2. Relationship between partisan social identity and affective 
polarization at differing levels of open classroom climate.  
 




Figure 5.3. Relationship between partisan social identity and affective 
polarization at differing levels of exposure to good social studies pedagogy. 
 
 Following the discussion, students’ affective polarization score from the pre-
discussion questionnaire was subtracted from the post-discussion score to create a change 
in affective polarization score. The change in affective polarization was analyzed using 
regression. Using the models from Table 5.7 as a base, demographic factors as well as 
group conditions and discussion quality measures were added to the model. Several 
iterations of the model were run to improve model fit by removing non-significant 
predictors. In addition, several interaction terms from the previous model, plus an 
interaction between group condition and partisan identity were tested. The interactions 
between partisan social identity and both social studies pedagogy and group condition 
both improved model fit and were retained. The results are shown in Table 5.8.  
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While the results from the basic model do not provide support for H3c, those from 
the interaction model do. These results indicate that the relationship between partisan 
social identity and change in affective polarization is contingent on group condition (β = 
2.06, p < .01). For students in mixed groups, the relationship between partisan social 
identity and change in affective polarization is as predicted in H3c, with stronger partisan 
identities being associated with increases in affective polarization and weaker partisan 
identities being associated with decreases. For students in uniform groups, this 
relationship is contrary to the prediction. Students with low partisan identity strength 
showed increases in affective polarization whereas those with high partisan identity 
strength tended to decrease their levels of affective polarization. Figure 5.4 illustrates the 











   115 
 
Table 5.8  
 
Regression Predicting Changes in Students’ Affective Polarization Score from Pre- 
to Post-Discussion 
 Model 5.8.A (Basic 
Model) 
Model 5.8.B (Interaction 
Model) 
 β (SD) β (SD) 
Partisan Social Identity      -0.21 (.45)        -3.90 (1.68) * 
Strength of Partisanship         4.65 (2.67)     2.63 (2.60) 
Social Studies Pedagogy      -1.07 (.54)       -3.36 (1.32) * 
Open Classroom Climate       0.80 (.47)   0.84 (.45) 
External Pol. Efficacy      -0.02 (.51)  -0.29 (.49) 
Civic Knowledge        -2.11 (1.23)     -0.96 (1.22) 
Classmate’s Partisan 
Distance 
       -2.35 (1.44)    -1.69 (1.38) 
Group Condition - Mixed        -1.75 (3.81)         -34.27 (12.35) ** 
Group Problem Talk          0.46 (.22) *      0.51 (.21) * 
Level of Disagreement     -0.43 (.71)   -0.72 (.67)  
White              -13.17 (6.71)    -9.74 (6.48) 
Partisan Soc. ID: Mixed         2.06 (.76) ** 
Partisan Soc. ID:SS 
Pedagogy 
   0.13 (.08) 
Constant       14.61 (11.94)          78.07 (29.05) ** 
Adjusted R2 .14 * .23 ** 
Note. *p < .05, **p <.01 
  
 




Figure 5.4. Relationship between partisan social identity and changes in affective 
polarization following an online discussion.  
 
The Impact of Group Condition 
The results of analyses for H3b and H3c provide mixed support for H3d. When 
predicting changes in opinion, group condition did not function as a moderator of partisan 
social identity. When predicting changes in affective polarization, however, group 
condition did act as moderator. The impact of the interaction, however, produces an 
effect for students in uniform groups in the opposite direction than what would be 
expected. I will consider possible explanations for this counterintuitive result below.  
R3 Results Summary 
The third research question focused on the impacts of the discussion exercise on 
partisan and non-partisan students. Following their online discussions, students generally 
showed an increase in external political efficacy, regardless of gender, race, family 
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income, or strength of partisanship. These increases were stable over the course of two 
weeks and did not significantly decrease between Q2 and Q3. Internal political efficacy 
showed a sharp increase from Q1 to Q2 and an equally sharp decrease from Q2 to Q3, 
with an overall non-significant difference from Q1 to Q3. These findings provide 
moderate support for H3a, as external political efficacy showed a stable increase 
following discussion, whereas changes in internal efficacy disappeared after two weeks.  
 H3b predicted that partisan students would be more likely to strengthen their 
opinion following a discussion than non-partisan students. There was only limited 
support for this hypothesis, as analysis did initially show a relationship between partisan 
identity strength and strengthening of student opinion Later analyses, however, indicted 
that external political efficacy was a far more significant predictor.  
 H3c was also moderately supported, though it was found that the effects of 
partisan identity strength were contingent on the group context of students’ discussions. 
Students in mixed partisan groups showed the expected positive relationship between 
partisan strength and change in affective polarization. Uniform political groups, on the 
other hand, showed an inverse relationship between partisan identity strength and 
changes in affective polarization.  
Discussion of R3: Partisan and Non-Partisan Students Following the Discussion 
 In addition to having different knowledge and efficacy prior to discussion and 
behaving differently during the discussion, partisans are impacted differently by online 
discussion. While all students seemed to benefit from the discussion in terms of their 
political efficacy, partisans show differing patterns of opinion change and changes in 
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feelings about political groups than non-partisans (though this latter change is contingent 
on group condition).  
Changes in Political Efficacy 
As expected, students in all groups showed a general trend of increasing external 
political efficacy that was still evident at the follow-up survey two weeks after the 
discussion. Internal efficacy showed an initial increase, though that increase did not 
persist through the follow-up survey two weeks later. Studies of classroom discussions 
generally note that students who discuss issues in school show increased political efficacy 
(Hess, 2009). Because participation in a discussion requires students to show their 
knowledge and advocate for an opinion on a political matter, a change in external 
efficacy would be expected. An increase in internal efficacy following discussion would 
also be expected, as students generally become more knowledgeable about issues and 
institutions over the course of a discussion, thereby increasing their sense of competence. 
Unfortunately, the boost to internal efficacy did not endure beyond the discussion 
exercise, possibly because the information learned from the discussion was no longer 
relevant to the content of the courses or students’ concerns. Despite partisans tending to 
have higher political efficacy at the start of the discussion, there were no significant 
associations with partisan social identity strength and increases in external political 
efficacy. Partisan social identity predicted increases in internal political efficacy from Q1 
to Q2, though as noted earlier, the changes were not stable. In addition, it seems that 
group condition did not affect changes in students’ political efficacy.  
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These results add two points to the literature suggesting that discussions of 
controversial issues have a positive impact on students’ political efficacy. First, it raises 
the question of what types of political efficacy were promoted by the online discussion. 
Both internal and external efficacy increased, though only external efficacy seemed to be 
stable over the course of two weeks. Second, it raises the question of what teachers can 
do to ensure that the internal, knowledge-based efficacy gained from the discussion does 
not disappear as soon as students move on to another topic.  
Changes in Student Opinion 
Following the discussion, students were asked whether they perceived that their 
opinion got stronger or weaker. This measure provides insight into student thinking that 
might not necessarily be captured on a scale of how much a student agrees or disagrees 
with a given proposition (Wojcieszak & Price, 2010). Namely, students’ positions on a 
given issue may or may not change over the course of that discussion, but they may feel 
their opinion was confirmed or challenged during the discussion. The regression models 
for student changes in opinion initially indicated that partisan social identity was 
positively correlated with a strengthened opinion after the discussion. Further 
investigation, however, revealed that political knowledge and efficacy were much better 
predictors of opinion strengthening than partisan identity strength. Further, there was a 
significant interaction between external political efficacy and political knowledge, 
indicating that civic knowledge acts as a moderator of political efficacy’s relationship to 
opinion change (or external political efficacy is acting as a moderator of civic 
knowledge’s relationship to opinion change).  
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 These results do not necessarily mean that changes in opinion are completely 
unrelated to partisanship, though they do suggest that partisans’ tendency to strengthen 
their opinion after discussion may be more a function of increased knowledge and 
efficacy typically correlated with partisanship rather than the partisanship itself. While 
this means that partisans, because they typically have higher knowledge and political 
efficacy, are more likely to strengthen their opinions, non-partisan students with similar 
characteristics will also likely strengthen their opinions.  
 Looking closer at civic knowledge as a moderator of the relationship between 
external political efficacy and opinion change, it seems that knowledge is acting as an 
enabler of political efficacy. When individuals score low on the measure of civic 
knowledge, the relationship between opinion change and efficacy is practically flat. 
Individuals scoring high on measures of civic knowledge, however, show a positive 
relationship between efficacy and strengthening of opinions. In other words, students 
who have a basic knowledge of governmental functioning plus a belief that their actions 
can make a difference are also more likely to have their opinions confirmed by the 
discussion.  
 Students high in knowledge and efficacy are likely to be among the higher 
performing students in any given social studies class and thus may be overlooked by 
teachers who use discussion. Yet, these students are also more likely to reinforce their 
own beliefs during a discussion. Teachers may need to go out of their way to make sure 
these students challenge their existing positions in the course of an online discussion. It 
should be noted that strengthening one’s opinion is not, in and of itself, normatively 
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negative. Rather, it is important for teachers to be sure that students whose opinions are 
likely to be strengthened by a discussion have considered alternative perspectives. While 
the format of the online discussion used in this study certainly exposed many of these 
students to differing opinions, some discussion formats may be better at generating 
perspective taking than others. Structured Academic Controversies (Avery, Levy, & 
Simmons, 2013), for example, require all participants in the discussion to present 
arguments for both sides of the issue, something that was not a requirement for this study. 
Overall, these results suggest that teachers should be cognizant of the features of varying 
discussion formats and choose the one that will best encourage growth in the students in 
their classroom.  
Student Feelings About Political Groups Before Discussion 
Political polarization is often cited as one of the key challenges to democratic 
citizenship education (Campaign for the Civic Mission of Schools, 2011; Commission on 
Youth Voting and Civic Knowledge, 2013). Differences of political opinion, however, 
are not normatively problematic, regardless of how systemic they are. Disagreements are 
a part of democracy. The way those disagreements are handled, however, has the 
potential to be problematic. Affective polarization, or increasingly positive feelings about 
one’s own political group and negative feelings toward opposing groups, is a more 
suitable measure of problematic political divisions.  
 As of this writing, there are no studies of affective polarization in high school 
students of which I am aware. As such, before measuring how affective polarization 
changes in response to a controversial issues discussion, I wanted to create a picture of 
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affective polarization in the high school classroom prior to the discussion. As would be 
expected from studies of adults, there is a positive relationship between students’ partisan 
social identity and their level of affective polarization. A student with a strong partisan 
social identity is likely more affectively polarized than students with weak partisan social 
identities.  
 There is also evidence that what happens in the social studies classroom can have 
measurable impacts on students’ levels of affective polarization. Both the open classroom 
climate measure and exposure to good social studies pedagogy (e.g., frequent 
discussions, attention to current events, community projects) significantly moderated the 
relationship between partisan social identity and the students’ levels of affective 
polarization. Furthermore, the direction of these two moderators is oppositional. In other 
words, students who perceive highly open classroom climates tend to have a weaker, 
though still positive, relationship between partisan social identity and affective 
polarization. Students historically exposed to a high number of good social studies 
pedagogies, on the other hand, show a stronger relationship between partisan social 
identity and affective polarization.  
 From a political psychological perspective, these differing impacts of the two 
variables make sense. Social connections, such as those built in classrooms with open 
climates, have been suggested as a way to decrease partisan discord (Haidt, 2012). If 
partisan strife is built around competing social identities (Iyengar & Westwood, 2015), 
classes that form strong communities might provide an alternate identity that can 
counteract the effect of partisan social identity. Further, good social studies pedagogy is 
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designed to develop the very things that are also commonly associated with polarized 
partisan identities, such as civic knowledge and political engagement (Hess & McAvoy, 
2014). The skills that students develop when exposed to good social studies pedagogy 
can also be used to justify and reinforce partisan identities.  
 In social studies research, pedagogy and classroom climate are often linked 
(Hahn, 1996). The success of many discussion exercises, for example, hinges on students 
feeling safe enough to express their views. The results from this study, however, 
highlight that pedagogy and climate are separate constructs that can have differing effects 
in a classroom. When studying complex political behaviors in the context of a social 
studies classroom, researchers should expect that disparate elements of the classroom 
could have opposing effects, and that promoting one outcome, such as civic knowledge 
or political engagement may have a tradeoff, such as higher affective polarization.  
 It is important to note that there is no evidence from the present study to indicate 
that good social studies pedagogy necessarily facilitates affective polarization. Rather, the 
evidence points towards the potential of good pedagogies to increase affective 
polarization. It is possible that variations in the way pedagogies are employed (e.g., there 
are vastly different interpretations among students and teachers of what constitutes a 
“discussion”) and the content taught could produce different patterns than those found in 
these data.  
These results also provide a new array of questions to investigate when studying 
discussions in the classroom. For example, researchers should study whether the impact 
of open classroom climates can be magnified to counteract the tendency of good 
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pedagogy to increase affective polarization. Careful attention to discussion climates or, as 
noted earlier, issues of teacher disclosure, may identify particular discussion strategies 
that create a larger sense of community and common identity in the classroom. 
Furthermore, future research should examine the long-term impacts of climate and 
pedagogy on affective polarization. It is currently unknown whether these effects on 
affective polarization persist into adulthood.  
Changes in Feelings About Political Groups After Discussion 
After establishing that there is a relationship between affective polarization and 
partisan social identity prior to discussion, I then analyzed how students’ affective 
polarization changed after the discussion. I anticipated that partisan social identity would 
predict increases in affective polarization. It was also hoped that discussing in a mixed 
group would moderate those increases. In other words, the hypothesis predicted that the 
impact of partisan social identity on changes in affective polarization would be less in 
mixed-opinion groups than in uniform partisan groups.  
The results were the opposite of the hypothesized interaction. Mixed groups 
showed the expected positive relationship between partisan social identity and changes in 
affective polarization. Individuals in mixed groups with stronger partisan social identities 
tended to be more affectively polarized after the discussion than before it. The uniform 
groups, however, defied expectations and had a negative relationship between partisan 
social identity and affective polarization. Students in uniform groups who had strong 
partisan social identities showed a decrease in affective polarization after the discussion.  
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There are several possible explanations for these counterintuitive results. To 
begin, it is fair to question whether the result is a quirk of the sample or the particular 
discussion context. Because of the relatively small sample size, unique circumstances, 
such as students doing a particularly diligent job research opposing viewpoints, would 
not be balanced out by more typical partisan biased information seeking. The results 
could also be a function of the particular measures used. As would be expected, the two 
uniform independent groups aside, groups composed of partisans were more affectively 
polarized at the beginning than the mixed groups, which contained more self-identified 
independents. On the whole, the uniform groups were still more affectively polarized 
after the discussion than the mixed groups. Because they were more polarized to begin 
with, it may be that strongly partisan individuals in uniform groups had nowhere to go on 
the scale if they became more affectively polarized. The members of uniform groups with 
strong partisan identities who became less affectively polarized may create the 
impression of a downward trend in the model. Factors not in the model could also have 
impacted the results. While there were no differences between uniform and mixed groups 
in terms of measured discussion behaviors, it is possible there were other differences 
among the groups not captured by the surveys.   
There is a possibility that the result is not an artifact of the sample or 
measurement, but is reflective of a process among students with strong partisan social 
identities. Perhaps students with strong partisan identities who encountered little 
disagreement in their groups felt confident enough that they did not feel the need to 
reinforce their self-esteem through high ratings of their own party or low ratings of the 
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opposition. Ideally, students with strong identities are seeking out alternative perspectives 
in the course of their research and are more open to those perspectives in the absence of 
partisan threat in their uniform groups. Conversely, it is also possible that students with 
weaker partisan social identities had their beliefs or opinions reinforced by their 
conversations in uniform groups, accounting for their increase in polarization. More 
investigation and replication is needed in order to narrow the range of possibilities for 
this result.  
It is also hoped that being in a mixed group might mitigate affective polarization. 
While this seems to be true for students who report low and mid-range partisan social 
identity, students reporting higher partisan social identity seem to become more 
affectively polarized, even in mixed groups. It may be that students in mixed partisan 
groups experience the opposite phenomenon as those in uniform groups. Partisan students 
with lower social identity scores may not feel as threatened by exposure to alternative 
viewpoints as those with higher partisan identities. As a result, they may not feel the need 
to reinforce their identity through low ratings of the opposite party or high ratings of their 
own party following the discussion.  
 Despite some lingering uncertainty regarding the findings for uniform groups and 
affective polarization, it is clear that what happens during an online discussion of a 
controversial issue matters for students. It is also clear that partisanship impacts how 
students respond to a controversial issue discussion, though in the case of opinion change 
it appears that these changes are more due to the correlates of partisanship than 
partisanship itself. Importantly, there is evidence that classroom experiences, particular 
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an open classroom climate, tend to reduce affective polarization in students. Such a 
finding is important in that it suggests that political socialization may play a role in the 
formation of partisan animosity beyond that of establishing identities through parents or 
community. Further investigations should extensively test how open classroom climate 
impacts students’ levels of affective polarization in other conditions.  
Research Question 4 
Research question four inquired about the extent to which students learn opposing 
perspectives and arguments from the discussion. The question and its hypotheses are 
listed below: 
R4: Does the strength of students’ partisanship influence the degree to which they 
consider differing opinions or opposing arguments?  
H4a: Partisan students will exhibit a significantly higher argument 
repertoire score than non-partisan students prior to discussion. 
H4b: Partisan students will be significantly less likely to incorporate new 
information into their understanding of the issue following deliberation 
than non-partisan students. 
H4c: Partisan students will be less likely to recall information that 
supports an opposing side of the issue at the end of the term.  
 If partisan students are more prone to motivated reasoning and biased information 
seeking, they should, in general, recall more reasons from their own side of the argument 
and less from the other. The key measure in this research question is argument repertoire 
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(Capella, Price, & Nir, 2002), or the difference between arguments a student produced for 
his or her own side of the discussion and ones generated for the opposing side.  
 Argument repertoire score was tallied by subtracting the number of opposing 
arguments listed from the number of supporting arguments. Table 5.9 lists the average 
argument repertoire score for each questionnaire, separated by uniform and mixed group 
conditions. Positive scores indicate a balance of information in favor of students’ original 
opinion. Notably, both groups show a significant decline in the number of opposing 
arguments they are able to generate during the end of the study questionnaire (t = -3.67, p 
< .001).    
Table 5.9 
 
Argument Repertoire Scores by Group Condition  
 Time 1 Time 2 Time 3 
Uniform    
  Supporting 2.58 2.57 2.38 
  Opposing 2.13 2.30 1.77 
  Difference 0.44 0.27 0.61 
Mixed    
  Supporting 2.70 2.89 2.60 
  Opposing 2.00 2.15 1.72 
  Difference 0.70 0.74 0.88 
 
Pre-Discussion Differences in Argument Repertoire 
 Both t-tests and regression models were used to analyze differences between 
partisans and non-partisans in terms of argument repertoire. Results of the t-tests indicate 
that there were no significant differences in argument repertoire score in the sample 
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between partisans and non-partisans during the pre-discussion survey. Regression models 
controlling for demographics and prior social studies experiences also showed no 
significant relationships between partisanship or partisan social identity and starting 
argument repertoire score. Thus, there is no support for H4a in the present sample.  
Table 5.10 
 
Regression Predicting Change in Argument Repertoire Scores from Q1 to Q2 
 β SE 
Partisan Social Identity 0.09    0.04 * 
Group Condition - Mixed 0.56 0.37 
Level of Disagreement -0.15    0.07 * 
Group Problem Talk -0.05    0.02 * 
Social Studies Pedagogy -0.10    0.05 * 




Civic Knowledge 0.18 0.12 
Political Efficacy - 
Internal 
-0.04 0.04 
Political Efficacy - 
External 
0.02 0.06 
Constant -0.82 1.28 
Adjusted R2 .13 *  
Note. * p < .05 
 
Change in Argument Repertoire Following Discussion 
 Analysis of H4b used regression to model the change in argument repertoire from 
the pre- to post-discussion questionnaire. Key predictor variables were partisan social 
identity, group condition (uniform or mixed), and the amount of problem talk at both the 
group and individual level. Controls were added for demographics, school experiences, 
civic knowledge, and political efficacy. To improve model fit, several non-significant 
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predictors were dropped. Interactions between partisan social identity and group 
conditions were tested, though they did not substantially improve the model. Table 5.10 
displays the results of the analysis.  
 The results of the regression analysis provide support for H4b. Partisan identity 
strength is correlated with a significant increase in the students’ argument repertoire score 
(β = .09, p < .05), indicating that the balance of arguments from the pre- to post- 
discussion questionnaires shifted in favor of students’ existing opinion. Although group 
condition was not a significant predictor of change in argument repertoire score, the 
reported amount of disagreement between a student and their group predicts a decline in 
argument repertoire scores (β = -.15, p < .05). Additionally, the total amount of problem 
talk in each group was inversely correlated with argument repertoire scores (β = -.05, p < 
.05).    
Table 5.11 
 
Regression Predicting Change in Argument Repertoire Scores from Q2 to Q3 
 β SE 
Partisan Social Identity -0.13      0.04 ** 
Group Condition - Mixed -2.29    0.95 * 
Level of Disagreement  0.08 0.05 
Social Studies Pedagogy  0.05 0.04 
Open Classroom Climate -0.06 0.04 
Political Efficacy - 
External 
-0.04 0.04 
White -1.05    0.52 * 
SES  0.30 0.19 
Partisan Soc. ID: Mixed  0.15    0.06 * 
Constant  2.59    1.17 * 
Adjusted R2         .17 **  
Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01 
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Argument Repertoire at the End of the Study 
Following the same procedure as H4b, analysis of H4c used regression models to 
predict changes in argument repertoire from the post-discussion to the follow-up 
questionnaire two weeks later. Table 5.11 displays the final model. In contrast to the 
model for H4b, this model shows a significant interaction between partisan social identity 
and group condition (β = .15, p < .05). This interaction indicates that the impact of 
partisan social identity on change in argument repertoire in the weeks following the 
discussion is different depending on whether the student was in a uniform or mixed 
group. In mixed groups, there is a positive relationship between partisan social identity 
and change in argument repertoire at the end of the study. In uniform groups, the 
correlation is inverse, with high partisan identity students showing a reduction in their 
argument repertoire scores. Figure 5.5 illustrates this interaction. Thus, the analysis 
partially supports H4c, as partisans in mixed groups did tend to show increases in 
argument repertoire scores, though these results were not replicated in uniform groups.  
R4 Results Summary 
While partisanship did not predict differences in starting argument repertoire 
scores (H4a), partisan identity strength was predictive of changes in argument repertoire 
scores over the course of the study. H4b was supported by the data, with increases in 
argument repertoire scores correlated with increases in partisan social identity. Further, 
H4c was partially supported, with students in mixed groups showing a positive 
relationship between partisan identity strength and argument repertoire. The opposite 
relationship was observed in students who discussed in uniform groups.  
   132 
 
 
Figure 5.5. Relationship between partisan social identity and change in argument 
repertoire scores across group conditions.  
 
Discussion of R4: Biased Assimilation of Political Information 
Delving further into the impacts of discussions on students, I also examined the 
degree to which students were able to learn about their own position and positions 
disagreeing with theirs. In particular, I wanted to investigate whether students were 
exhibiting biased assimilation of information over the course of the discussion. Biased 
assimilation was tested through the use of an argument repertoire measure, which 
subtracts the number of arguments students can generate for somebody who would 
disagree with their position from the number that students can generate for their position. 
While it is expected that most students would be able to generate more arguments for 
positions they agree with at the start of the study, the changes from survey to survey were 
more of interest. These changes indicate whether or not students are becoming more 
balanced in their knowledge of arguments for or against a position (a decreasing 
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argument repertoire score) or whether they are exhibiting biased assimilation of positions 
that support their own (an increasing argument repertoire score).  
 Prior to looking at partisanship as an explanatory variable, I examined the general 
trends of argument repertoire scores across all students. Generally, mixed groups had 
higher argument repertoire scores throughout the study. The point that stands out is the 
rapid decline of arguments recalled by both groups at the follow-up survey two weeks 
after the discussion. The decline in information is such that students are generating fewer 
arguments both in support of and against their position than they were at the beginning of 
the study. It is likely that survey fatigue is to blame for some of the decline in arguments. 
The follow-up survey was the third time the students had been exposed to this particular 
set of questions in a relatively short time period. In addition, argument repertoire is one 
of the more cognitively demanding measures on the surveys. It may be that fatigue with 
the measures and taking surveys in general caused them to put less effort into these 
questions.  
 Even if survey fatigue is partially to blame for the general decline in raw numbers 
of arguments, it is interesting that argument repertoire scores actually rose in both types 
of group. This is driven mostly by declines in the amount of opposing information that 
both groups were able to recall. In other words, even if they were fatigued and willing to 
expend less effort overall, students were more willing to expend effort on information 
that agreed with their position than information that disagreed with it. These results are in 
line with literature stating that individuals are more apt to dismiss information that 
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disagrees with their pre-conceived notions (Nyhan & Reifler, 2015) or threatens their 
social identity (Dalton & Huang, 2014).  
Partisans and Changes in Argument Repertoire 
Partisan social identity was positively associated with a change in argument 
repertoire from pre- to post-discussion. The stronger a student’s partisan social identity, 
the more their argument repertoire tended to increase immediately following the 
discussion. These changes were counteracted in the model by the levels of disagreement 
reported by students and group levels of problem talk. Thus, students who had richer 
discussions with higher levels of disagreement tended to show reduced argument 
repertoire scores immediately following the discussion. Although it would be intuitive to 
think that students experienced more of both of these elements in mixed groups, students 
in mixed groups did not show any significant decrease in argument repertoire scores 
compared to their peers in uniform groups (although this may be partially explained by 
mixed groups also having a higher number of reported disagreement than uniform 
groups).  
 The finding that partisan social identity strength serves to increase argument 
repertoire is consistent with other work on partisan identity and learning (Kunda, 1990; 
Lodge & Tabor, 2013). Such a finding once again emphasizes the need for teachers to 
consider the tendencies of partisans when designing discussion experiences. In this case, 
given that higher levels of disagreement were predictive of decreased argument 
repertoire, it may be wise to place partisans in mixed-opinion groups where they are 
likely to encounter disagreement.  
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 Two weeks after the discussion, students completed a final argument repertoire 
measure and the change from Q2 to Q3 was calculated. The explanatory picture for 
argument repertoire change at the end of the study is more complex than that immediately 
following the discussion. Like changes from the pre- to post-questionnaires, it seems that 
the level of group problem talk was again influential in reducing argument repertoire 
scores. However, the effect for level of disagreement did not explain as much variance in 
this model as did an interaction term between partisan social identity and group 
condition. Similar to the group condition interaction effect when predicting levels of 
affective polarization, this interaction effect produces a surprising result for uniform 
groups, even while the mixed group results are expected. In the mixed group, increased 
partisan social identity predicts increased argument repertoire. The uniform group, 
however, shows the opposite effect; students with higher partisan social identities show 
reductions in argument repertoire while those with lower social identities showed a 
marked increase.  
 Once again, there is a counterintuitive moderating effect for group condition. 
Similar to the interaction term results for affective polarization discussed earlier, there 
may be issues with the sample (quirks of the particular school context) or measurement 
(highly partisan individuals having nowhere to go but down on the Argument repertoire 
score). It is also important, however, to consider the possibility that some part of the 
discussion process is responsible for the unexpected results. Namely, it may have to do 
with partisans in the uniform groups being unable (or not feeling motivated) to learn 
more about their own side of the argument from their group members. Students high in 
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social identity in a uniform partisan group may not have anything to learn from their co-
partisan peers in terms of arguments (whereas low partisan social identity students may 
learn a lot from those who tend to have stronger identities). This would cause high levels 
of change in low social identity partisans and little or no change in high social identity 
partisans, causing the negative association seen in the model.  
 As with the results for affective polarization, the mixed group results illustrate a 
positive relationship between partisan social identity and change in argument repertoire. 
Students with high partisan social identity scores tend to increase their argument 
repertoire scores while students with lower partisan social identity scores tend to show a 
decrease in the score. Students with lower partisan social identities may be more open to 
difference when placed in mixed groups, and would therefore show a more even balance 
of information at the end of the discussion exercise. High partisan social identity scores, 
in contrast, may indicate that the individual is threatened by other perspectives, and may 
seek to reinforce their identities by either learning new arguments in support of their 
position or, more likely, ignoring arguments against their position.   
 These results suggest a number of questions for research and practice. A primary 
area of concern is whether students are recalling alternative perspectives they learned 
during the discussion. If students are not retaining the information that is in opposition to 
their positions, then it is questionable whether the discussion is fulfilling its democratic 
purpose. Teachers must strive to ensure that discussions are not just topical one-off 
events. Given the wide array of content needing to be taught in any civic education 
scenario, it is impractical for most teachers to spend entire semesters on a single topic just 
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to ensure better recall. Part of the difficulty is the inauthenticity of a school discussion. 
Since the students are participating as part of their course, they are likely having a 
conversation that they might not have had otherwise. In such a situation, even the most 
open-minded student, partisan or not, would find it difficult to retain information that 
does not fit neatly into their schemas. Ideally, civic education would be framed as a 
process where one’s views were constantly challenged and students believed that every 
activity contributed to their growth as members of an engaged, democratic populace. 
Researchers should examine the circumstances under which students show long-term 
retention of identity-inconsistent information. Practitioners should seek to promote 
climates that encourage as much engagement with differences as possible in the 
classroom and continually reinforce the value of understanding multiple perspectives on 
each issue.  
 Both the current and previous chapter have shared and discussed results from a 
study of online discussions. The final chapter will summarize these results, revisit 
implications for research and practice, and identify the contributions to the field of social 
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CHAPTER 6 
IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
This study examined four lines of inquiry related to partisanship and the social 
studies classroom. These four research questions are listed below:  
R1:  Are partisan students different from their non-partisan peers in terms of 
political and civic knowledge, sense of political efficacy, and perceptions of the 
classroom environment (e.g., climate for discussion, perceptions of classmates, 
and teacher opinion)? 
R2:  Do partisan students behave differently than their non-partisan peers in the 
context of small group deliberations? Does the composition of deliberative groups 
(uniformly partisan or mixed) moderate these behaviors? 
R3: Are partisan and non-partisan students impacted differently by deliberation? 
Specifically, are changes in sense of political efficacy, opinions about political 
groups (e.g., Democrats, Republicans), or issue opinions different between 
partisans and non-partisans? Does deliberative group composition moderate these 
changes?  
R4: Does the strength of students’ partisanship influence the degree to which they 
consider differing opinions or opposing arguments?  
In this chapter, I summarize the results of my investigation into these four questions and 
provide recommendations for teachers and researchers. Lastly, I place the present study 
in the context of the broader field of social studies and interdisciplinary research.  
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Summary of Results 
 In the previous two chapters, I provided evidence of the impact of student 
partisanship before, during, and after an online discussion. In doing so, I have examined 
four areas: differences between partisans and non-partisans prior to the discussion, 
differences in behaviors these two groups exhibit during a discussion, differences in 
outcomes following a discussion, and differences in partisan and non-partisans ability to 
consider arguments.  
 The evidence gathered from the two participating schools shows baseline 
differences between partisans and non-partisans in civic knowledge (in the case of strong 
partisanship) and both internal and external political efficacy. Additionally, when 
students perceive their partisanship as different from the teacher, they also tend to 
perceive that classroom climate as less open. Further, students’ perception of their 
teacher’s or classmates’ ideology seems to affect their evaluations of their teacher more 
than their perception of the teacher’s partisanship. Student evaluations of the course were 
responsive to both perceptions of teacher partisanship and ideology. These findings 
illustrate that student partisanship is a factor that merits consideration by teachers and 
researchers.  
 During a discussion, partisans engage in more “problem talk,” or direct discussion 
of the problem facing the group, primarily relying on argumentation. These arguments 
can include hypothetical examples, appeals to emotion, or simply stating reasons for their 
position that are unsupported by facts. In other words, while partisans’ contributions to 
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the online discussions were perhaps more frequent than those of other students, they were 
not necessarily of better quality.  
Partisanship seems to be playing a role in how students are impacted by the 
discussion, though that role is not as straightforward as initially predicted. Following the 
discussion, partisan and non-partisan students exhibited an increase in external political 
efficacy that did not substantially decrease when measured again two weeks following 
the discussion. When measuring the degree to which students felt their opinion strength 
changed, however, partisanship was not as strong an influence as external political 
efficacy and civic knowledge. Further, students’ affective polarization scores, which 
capture their balance of feelings towards the two major political parties, were impacted 
by the discussion, though in a manner that is contingent on the students’ partisan social 
identity and group condition. Surprisingly, students discussing in uniform partisan groups 
did not show the expected positive relationship between identity strength and changes in 
affective polarization. When predicting that same relationship in mixed partisan groups, 
however, increases in the strength of a students’ partisan social identity were predictive 
of increases in affective polarization, as expected.  
Diving deeper into the effects of partisanship on the outcomes of an online 
discussion, I analyzed changes in students’ argument repertoire scores. These scores 
reflect the number of arguments a student can generate for each side of the issue under 
discussion. As would be expected, students generally had argument repertoire scores that 
were positive, meaning that they could generate more arguments for their own position 
than the opposing position. Regardless of whether they were in mixed or uniform groups, 
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students tended to show a drop in the number of opposing arguments when measured two 
weeks following the discussion. When examining the changes with regression, 
partisanship significantly predicted increases in the argument repertoire score from the 
pre- to post-discussion questionnaires. The effect of partisan social identity on argument 
repertoire from the post-discussion questionnaire to the end of the study questionnaire 
was contingent on student group condition. Interestingly, the uniform groups showed an 
inverse relationship between partisan social identity and argument repertoire, while 
mixed groups showed the expected positive relationship.  
While in many cases the relationship between partisanship and student behavior 
during the study was expected, there are many cases where it was not. It is possible that 
these findings represent artifacts of the sample or the design of the discussion forums. On 
the other hand, the tendency of weakly identified partisans in uniform groups to show 
increases in both affective polarization and argument repertoire could indicate that they 
are being influenced by those in their group with stronger partisan identities. The slight 
decrease in both affective polarization and argument repertoire on the part of strongly 
identified partisans in uniform groups, while perhaps also a product of sample, 
measurement, or context, could also indicate students were moderating their opinions. It 
is also possible that these students with strong partisan social identities were not 
threatened by the presence of opposing arguments in their groups and did not feel the 
need to reinforce their ideas as much as their peers with weaker partisan social identities. 
The need for more research into partisan social identities and their interaction with group 
conditions will be noted below.   
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Implications for Teachers and Researchers 
 Because the current study of partisan students is multifaceted, it has multiple 
implications for practice and research. I have collected and synthesized those 
recommendations in this section.  
Implications for Teachers 
First, teachers need to recognize that political partisanship, much like race, class, 
and gender, can strongly influence a given student’s social identity (Iyengar & 
Westwood, 2015). Like these other sources of identity, partisanship should not be ignored 
in the classroom, but rather addressed with care and attention to its historical and social 
implications. This is a challenging task for teachers, because political identity, even 
though it is often a function of environmental influences, is seen as something chosen by 
the student and therefore not “protected” in the same ways non-voluntary sources of 
identity are. Partisan identity, however, can function as a barrier, inhibiting discourse in 
the classroom and impacting student learning. Just as teachers do not want students to 
“shut down” due to perceptions of unfairness based on race, gender, or class, they should 
strive to avoid similar shutdowns based on political identity. Based on the results of this 
study, open classroom climates are key to avoiding such situations and encouraging 
students of all political identities to participate.  
 Second, teachers should be aware of the “penalties” and “rewards” that 
accompany student perceptions of their partisan or ideological positions. While more 
empirical data is necessary to assess whether teachers should disclose their partisanship 
or political ideology (Hess & McAvoy, 2015), the present study illustrates the importance 
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of an open classroom climate. Students will likely guess at a teacher’s partisan or 
ideological leanings and, regardless of whether they are correct or not, these guesses 
influence their perceptions of the classroom. Having an open classroom climate, 
however, can mitigate the negative impacts of perceived political and ideological 
distance.  
Third, teachers have to constantly challenge students to hear and build empathy 
for diverse perspectives. The results of this study suggest that, for many students, 
alternative ideas are quickly forgotten in the weeks following a discussion exercise. 
While it may be difficult to constantly reinforce content, teachers can structure 
discussions and assignments in such a way as to humanize individuals who may disagree 
with a student (Haidt, 2012). Discussion formats, such as deliberation, that build empathy 
and emphasize seeking common ground can be employed for particularly divisive issues.  
Fourth, this study challenges the assumption that mixed opinion groups always 
produce better understanding of diverse perspectives than uniform opinion groups. 
Students with weak partisan social identities moderated their feelings towards opposing 
political groups and balanced their argument repertoire scores after discussing in mixed 
groups. However, students who discussed in uniform groups showed the opposite pattern. 
Although it is impractical to for teachers to do in-depth analyses of students’ partisan 
social identity prior to constructing discussion groups, teachers can monitor the outcomes 
of discussion exercises to better understand which groups of students might benefit from 
a different set of discussion partners.  
Implications for Researchers 
   144 
 
The results of the present study also suggest several directions for civic education 
researchers. To begin, education researchers must update their understanding of the 
political development of children. Researchers too often portray students as apolitical 
entities that, if molded correctly, will turn into discerning, committed citizens who vote 
and act based on rational consideration rather than partisan loyalty. This vision of 
students and citizens is woefully in need of updating (Achen & Bartels, 2016). Further, 
researchers must also update their understanding of schools as political spaces. A 
political classroom (Hess & McAvoy, 2015) may strive for open consideration of all 
viewpoints, but this study reveals that there is much happening beneath the surface of 
such spaces that merits consideration in social studies research.  
Similarly, while high-quality democratic education, discussion pedagogy 
included, provides numerous benefits, researchers must not be naïve about its potential to 
solve all the problems that accompany divisive partisan times. Scholars of civic education 
should conduct more studies that examine student cognition before, during, and after 
discussions to clearly identify the mental processes that govern students’ participation in 
and response to these pedagogies. Such research can provide a clearer understanding of 
the limits of discussions and deliberations and, possibly, suggest modifications or entirely 
new pedagogies that may better address the problems of partisan division.  
Student partisanship, while little explored in social studies, does not operate in 
isolation. Rather, it likely intersects and interacts with other elements of student identity. 
Because this study is one of the first investigations of student partisanship, I chose not to 
focus on other elements of identity, such as race, class, or gender. Additionally, the 
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context of the two schools did not provide enough diversity of race or class to 
meaningfully analyze differences in these areas. Future research should include 
partisanship as a factor of student identity and examine the intersections of these 
identities in the classroom.  
There is also a great need in social studies education for more research directly 
observing classroom discussions and measuring the mental processes involved. Such 
research should seek to replicate and extend the results of this study while addressing its 
limitations. For example, while the selected sample provided a number of advantages, the 
primary one being a diverse partisan environment, there are number of disadvantages that 
could be rectified in replications. A sample with greater diversity of race and income 
could provide insights into the interactions between political, racial, and class identities. 
A larger student sample size would also allow for more complex analyses and greater 
statistical power to detect differences between partisans and non-partisans. Replication 
with a diverse array of school sites and discussion topics would test whether the effects 
found in this study were unique to its particular context.  
Despite providing a deeper look at student partisanship than previous work in the 
social studies, this study still leaves many aspects of student partisanship unexplored. For 
example, while the present study examined differences between partisan and non-partisan 
students in civic knowledge and political efficacy, there are a number of potentially 
consequential correlates of civic behavior that could also impact students’ civic behavior 
and development. Concepts such as political cynicism (e.g. Erber & Lau, 1990), a 
variable potentially related to political disengagement among youth, could provide 
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further insight into the factors that influence student participation in discussions. In 
addition, the concepts featured in this work, such as affective polarization and motivated 
reasoning can be examined in greater depth and from different perspectives.  
Beyond research questions of student partisanship, this study illustrates that 
drawing on the disciplines of political science and psychology to inform research 
questions can prove fruitful. There are many elements of adult political behavior that 
could be influential in the classroom and researchers can use studies of adults in other 
social science disciplines to inspire research in schools. One potential area of exploration 
particularly relevant to studying student discourse is moral foundations theory (Feinberg 
& Willer, 2015; Haidt, 2012). Psychologists have often used moral foundations theory to 
research individuals’ tendency to speak “past” one another. Insights from such studies 
could help make student discussions more effective and meaningful. As noted earlier, 
interdisciplinary work in social studies is imperative and the fields of political science 
and psychology have much to offer teachers and researchers.  
Contributions and Conclusions 
A major contribution of this study is that it bridges the gap between social studies 
research and that in political science and psychology. Despite discussing many of the 
same issues regarding political deliberations, social studies researchers and those from 
political science and psychology rarely cross paths (Clark & Avery, 2016; Knowles & 
Clark, in preparation). Few works in social studies education examine student thinking or 
behavior using instruments from other disciplines (see Kahne & Bowyer, 2017 for an 
exception). As such, partisanship and its influence on thinking and behavior, an issue of 
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concern to political scientists and psychologists, has gone largely unstudied in education 
despite its relevance to contemporary citizenship. Recognizing this deficiency, Castro and 
Knowles (2017) argue, “any study or theoretical work exploring democratic citizenship 
within the field of social studies education should be regarded as incomplete if it fails to 
incorporate theories and empirical findings from other fields” (p. 309). In addition to 
incorporating concepts such as affective polarization and motivated reasoning, the 
present study provides evidence that they are present and meaningful in the social studies 
classroom. These findings further emphasize the benefits to social studies research and 
practice from interdisciplinary research. By incorporating these and other concepts into 
understandings of students’ civic learning, the civic mission of social studies education is 
enhanced.  
 This study also illustrates that the benefits of interdisciplinary work need not flow 
only from other disciplines to social studies. Rather, important concepts from social 
studies research can inform studies of political science and psychology. A key example of 
such a benefit is the open classroom climate measure. The present study finds that open 
classroom climate moderates the influence of partisan social identity on evaluations of 
teachers and affective polarization. While open classroom climate has been used in 
studies of political socialization (e.g., Schulz et al., 2010), I have not found it in any work 
on political polarization. Studies of partisan behavior in political science and psychology 
can gain from incorporating this measure (in the form of recall questions) or adapting it 
for adult political conversations. Given the complexity of political behavior, social 
scientists should draw on as many explanatory tools as possible.   
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 The political divisions in American society do not seem to be abating of their own 
accord and, in many ways, are deepening (Pew Research, 2014, 2016). Social studies 
should follow the lead of political scientists, psychologists, and scholars from a number 
of other fields by making an effort to understand the processes that drive these divisions, 
particularly in educational contexts. This study provides a unique look into students’ 
partisan feelings, or lack thereof, and the impacts they can have on the classroom during 
a discussion exercise. This study illustrates that partisan identities, though often ignored 
by social studies research, are correlated with differences in student knowledge, 
dispositions, and perceptions of the classroom. Further, partisan identities shaped how 
students interacted in the context of an online discussion of a controversial issue. Lastly, 
student partisanship predicted how students responded to the discussion in terms of their 
recall of information, changes of opinion, and feelings about political opponents. If social 
studies classrooms are to develop the citizenship capabilities of all students, 
understanding the impact of partisanship in the classroom is the first step towards 
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Appendix A – Survey Measures 
 
Internal Political Efficacy 
1 (Strongly Disagree) to 7 (Strongly Agree), α = .88 at Q3 
 
1. Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can’t 
really understand what’s going on. (reverse coded) 
2. I feel like I have a pretty good understanding of the important political issues facing 
our country.  
3. I think I am better informed about politics than most people my age. 
4. I feel that I could do as good a job in public office as most other people. 
5. I consider myself well-qualified to participate in politics. 
 
External Political Efficacy 
1 (Strongly Disagree) to 7 (Strongly Agree), α = .76 at Q3 
 
1. People like me don’t have any say about what the government does. (reverse coded) 
2. So many people vote in national elections that it doesn’t matter much whether I vote or 
not. (reverse coded) 
3. Public officials don’t care much about what people like me think. (reverse coded) 
 
Political/Civic Knowledge 
Students typed their responses in a text box underneath each question.   
 
1. Which political party currently has the most members in the United States House of 
Representatives? 
2. Who is currently the Vice President of the United States? 
3. Who is currently the governor of [state where research took place]? 
4. How long is the term of a United States Senator? 
5. How much of a majority in both houses of Congress is needed to override a 
presidential veto? 
 
Open Classroom Climate Scale  
1 (Never) to 5 (Always), α = .83 
 
When you discuss social and political issues during regular lessons, how often do the 
following things happen? 
1. Teachers encourage students to make up their own minds. 
2. Teachers encourage students to express their opinions. 
3. Students bring up current political events for discussion in class. 
4. Students express opinions in class even when their opinions are different from most of 
the other students. 
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5. Teachers encourage students to discuss political or social issues about which people 
have different opinions. 
6. Teachers present several sides of an issue when explaining it in class.  
 
Perceptions of Classmates and Teachers 
Teacher Evaluation Scale, α = .86 
 
1. How would you rate your teacher’s knowledge of the course material? 1 (Poor) to 4 
(Excellent)  
2. Would you say your teacher cares about students and their success? 1 (Almost never) 
to 5 (Almost all the time) 
3. Would you say the teacher presented materials in an objective and unbiased manner? 1 
(Almost never) to 5 (Almost all the time) 
4. The teacher shows a great deal of interest in the subject. 1 (Almost never) to 5 (Almost 
all the time) 
5. The instructor worked to provide a comfortable learning environment. 1 (Almost 
never) to 5 (Almost all the time) 
6. The instructor graded assignments fairly and consistently. 1 (Almost never) to 5 
(Almost all the time) 
7. Overall, I would rate this teacher as excellent. 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 5 (Strongly 
Agree) 
8. Overall, I would recommend this teacher to other students. 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 5 
(Strongly Agree) 
 
Course Evaluation Scale, α = .78 
1 (Strongly Disagree) to 5 (Strongly Agree). 
 
1. This course increased my interest in the subject.  
2. I learned a great deal in this course compared to others. 
3. I put more effort into this course than most others I have taken.  
4. Overall, I would rate this course as excellent. 
5. Overall, I would recommend this course to other students.  
 
Teacher Partisanship and Ideology 
Where do you think your teacher falls on the following partisan identity scale? 
1 (Strong Republican) to 7 (Strong Democrat) 
 
Where do you think your teacher falls on the following political ideology scale? 
1 (Strongly Conservative) to 7 (Strongly Liberal) 
 
Classmates’ Partisanship and Ideology 
Where do you think most of your classmates fall on the following partisan identity scale? 
1 (Strong Republican) to 7 (Strong Democrat) 
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Where do you think most of your classmates fall on the following political ideology 
scale? 
1 (Strongly Conservative) to 7 (Strongly Liberal) 
 
Perceived Disagreement and Opinion Change 
 
During your discussion, how often did you find yourself disagreeing with your group? 
1 (0-10%) to 10 (91-100%) 
 
During your discussion, did your opinion on [issue] move or change? Please use the scale 
below to indicate how your opinion did or did not move.  
1 (Moved strongly away from my previous opinion) to 9 (My opinion was strongly 
reinforced) 
 
Affective Polarization (Feeling Thermometers) 
Please use the sliders below to illustrate how you feel about different political groups in 
our country. You can move the sliders to anywhere between 0 and 100. NOTE: Even if 
you want to leave the slider where it is, you must click on the slider for the computer to 
record your response.  







In the spaces below, please list the arguments or reasons that support your opinion on 
[issue]. Please list as many reasons (up to 6) that you can think of. Write only one reason 
per space. You do not have to use all the spaces. 
 
In the spaces below, please list the arguments or reasons that somebody who is against 
your position on [issue] might give. Please list as many (up to 6) reasons you can think 
of. Write only one reason per space. You do not have to use all the spaces.  
 
Student Partisanship and Ideology 
 
Which of the following best describes your political ideology?  
1(Strongly Conservative) to 7 (Strongly Liberal) 
 
Which of the following political groups do you most identify with? 
Republican, Independent, Democrat, Other Party 
 
If student marks Republican or Democrat… 
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Would you call yourself a strong [Republican/Democrat] or not a very strong 
[Republican/Democrat]? 
Strong Democrat, Not a very strong democrat.  
 
If student marks Independent… 
Would you say you are closer to the Republican or the Democratic Party? 
Republican Party, Democratic Party, Neither 
 
Partisan Social Identity 
 
α = .89 for Democrats, α = .91 for Republicans, α = .90 for Independents 
 
1. To what extent do you feel certain about your [party name] political outlook? 1 (Not at 
all) to 4 (A great deal) 
2. To what extent is your [party name] political outlook a reflection of your core moral 
beliefs or ideas? 1 (Not at all) to 4 (A great deal) 
3. To what extent is your [party name] political outlook connected to your beliefs about 
fundamental questions of right and wrong? 1 (Not at all) to 4 (A great deal) 
4. How important is being [party name] to you? 1 (Not at all important) to 4 (Extremely 
important) 
5. How important is the term [party name] to you? 1 (Not at all important) to 4 
(Extremely important) 
6. When you talk about [party name], how often do you say “we” instead of “they?” 
1(Never) to 4 (All the time) 
7. To what extent do you think of yourself as a/an [party name]? 1 (Not at all) to 4 (A 
great deal) 
 
Social Studies/Civic Educational Experiences 
Based on your school experience up to this point, how often do you… (α = .74) 
1 (Never) to 5 (Once a week or more) 
 
1. Spend class time discussing current events? 
2. Have teachers encourage you to discuss political and social issues about which people 
have different opinions? 
3. Do research on social, political, or community issues for your class? 
4. Do community projects for your classes? 
5. Have teachers require you to keep up with politics or government either by reading the 
newspaper, watching TV, or using the Internet? 
6. Feel that the knowledge you get from your civics/government/social studies class is 
useful in your current, everyday life? 
 
School Democratic Climate 
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When you think about your school as a whole, how much do you agree/disagree with the 
following? 
1 (Strongly Disagree) to 5 (Strongly Agree), α = .73 
 
1. Students have a say in how the school is run.  
2. In general, students can disagree with teachers, if they are respectful.  
3. In general, students are encouraged to express opinions.  
4. Students feel like they are part of a community where people care about each other.  
 
Community and School Participation 
1 (Never) to 3 (Within the last year) 
 
Community Involvement (α = .62) 
Have you ever been involved in any of the following activites? 
1. Youth organization affiliated with a political party or union 
2. Environmental organization 
3. Human rights organization 
4. A voluntary group doing something to help in the community 
5. An organization collecting money for a social cause 
6. A cultural organization based on ethnicity or nationality 
7. A group of young people campaigning about an issue  
 
School Involvement (α = .70) 
At school, have you ever done any of the following activities? 
 
1. Active participation in a debate 
2. Voted for class representative, student council, or other forms of student government 
3. Taken part in decision-making about how the school is run 
4. Taken part in discussions in a student assembly or meeting 
5. Ran for class representative, student council, or other student government position  
 
Parental and Peer Civic Involvement 
1 (Never/Hardly ever) to 5 (Daily).  
 
How often do you talk about politics with your parents/guardians? 
How often do you talk about politics with your friends?  
 
Perceived Polarization 
In general, do you feel that Republicans and Democrats… (α = .78) 
1 (Not at all) to 5 (A great deal) 
 
1. Respect each other? 
2. Trust each other? 
3. Like each other? 
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Appendix B – Discussion Forum Instructions 
 
Loomis High School 
You have been conducting research on the issue of “Stop and Frisk” for this class. Using 
this forum, you will be having a discussion with several of your peers on this issue. 
Specifically, you will be discussing the following proposition:  
 
“Stop and Frisk” should be adopted nationwide as a means of reducing crime. 
 
During the course of your discussion, please make sure to provide at least one original 
post and one reply to one of your group mate’s posts.  
 
Nichols High School 
You have been conducting research on the issue of taxes for this class. Using this forum, 
you will be having a discussion with several of your peers on this issue. Specifically, you 
will be discussing the following proposition:  
 
Taxes should be raised to more evenly distribute income and better fund 
government programs. 
 
During the course of your discussion, please make sure to provide at least one original 
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Appendix C – Interview Questions 
 
1. General. You participated in an online discussion about [issue]. In general, what did 
you think about your discussion?  
 
a. What did you think about your discussion partners?  
 
b. Were you able to tell anything about your discussion partners (like their partisan 
affiliation)? [If yes: How long did it take you figure that out about them?] 
 
c. How comfortable were you sharing your ideas on politics with the group? 
 
d.   Was there any disagreement in your group? If so, how did you handle it? 
 
e.   Did your opinion change at all during the course of the discussion? In other words, 
did you feel more strongly about your original opinion, was your opinion challenged 
during the discussion, or somewhere in between? 
 
2. Politics in the classroom:  
 
a. Do you discuss political issues often in the classroom? How often? 
 
b. Are you comfortable sharing your ideas on politics in the classroom? Why or why not? 
 
c. How do you think most students in your class feel about politics? How do you know 
this? 
 
d. Do you think your teacher has a political opinion? If so: what do you think it is, and 
how do you know? 
 
e. What about outside of school? Do you follow politics? What do you think about 
politicians? Political parties?  
 
3. Student Voice: Do you feel your opinion heard during the discussion? 
 
5. Suggestions: Do you have any suggestions for changing the online discussions that 
would make it a better experience for students? 
 
6. Overall: Is there anything else you’d like to share with me about the online discussions 
that would help me have a better understanding of your experiences? 
 
7. Conclusion: I’ve asked a lot of questions today. Is there anything you’d like to ask me? 
 
